[GJM] Fw: [globalnetnews-summary] Bush's Middle East policy in tatters
mary rose
maryrose333 at att.net
Sat May 24 14:39:36 MDT 2008
FYI and consideration.
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Subject: [globalnetnews-summary] Bush's Middle East policy in tatters
"it is not that oil is becoming more expensive, but the dollar is becoming
cheaper."
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JE21Ak02.html
Bush's Middle East policy in tatters
The George W Bush administration's failure in rolling back Syrian and
Iranian influence in Lebanon pales in comparison with the withering away of
its Arab-Israeli "peace process". Time and again during Bush's recent Middle
East tour, what emerged was the palpable sense that the US has been all but
marginalized from a new Middle East that is taking shape. And now China,
too, has appeared on the region's chessboard. - M K Bhadrakumar (May 20,
'08)
Bush's Middle East policy in tatters
By M K Bhadrakumar
"They [Arab leaders] have stopped taking their instructions from Islam, they
have decided that peace with the Zionists is their strategic option, so damn
their decision." - Osama bin Laden, audio message, May 18
Last Tuesday, while United States President George W Bush was setting out
from Washington on a five-day tour of the Middle East, Iran's semi-official
Fars news agency quoted Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad as hinting that
Tehran might consider a cut in oil exports. Of course, Iranian Oil Minister
Gholamhossein Nozari quickly clarified that Tehran was only reviewing its
exports
and here, too, a decision was to be taken on a possible increase or
decrease.
Neither Ahmadinejad nor Nozari said anything like Iran was reviewing oil
output as such (which exceeds 4.2 million barrels per day, the highest level
since the 1979 Islamic revolution). But US oil prices went into a tizzy
nonetheless and hit a record high of US$126 per barrel by the time Bush
landed in the Persian Gulf region.
Bush was expected to press the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) for an early meet to raise oil production. (OPEC is scheduled to next
meet in September to decide on its oil output policy.) Stephen Hadley, the
US national security advisor, was on record that Bush would tell Saudi King
Abdullah that the oil-exporting countries should regard it to be in their
self-interest to "take into account the economic health of their customers
who pay these prices". In the event, when they met on Friday, Bush found
that the Saudi king was not to be persuaded.
Meanwhile, Nozari was back on stage. He told Fars news agency, "I believe
there is no need for an [emergency] OPEC meeting. Why should there be this
meeting when oil prices go up? The OPEC members are currently utilizing
their full capacity and are supplying the market ... With oil at US$126, it
is not wise for those with oil not to supply it." Nozari then added, "I
believe it is not that oil is becoming more expensive, but the dollar is
becoming cheaper."
It would have been unthinkable five or six years ago that a visiting US
president would receive such an open rebuff in the Middle East. Last
weekend's exchanges revealed the extent of decline in the US's dominance of
the Middle East through the present Bush administration. No doubt, oil lies
at the very center of the decline of the American dominion. The cascading
rise in oil prices has led to a massive transfer of resources to the energy
exporting countries. Iran is one principal beneficiary.
The huge accumulation of wealth enables Iran to exert influence regionally
and ensure there is practically nothing the US can do to stop its rise as a
regional power. Goldman Sachs in a report on Friday predicted oil would
further jump to a level of $140 by July. "The near-term outlook for oil
prices continues to be bullish," Goldman said. Investors are flocking to the
oil market as a hedge against the fall in the value of the dollar. The Wall
Street Journal has reported that at the moment the Iranians hold about 25
million barrels - about twice the quantum of the US's daily imports - of
heavy crude in offshore tankers in the Persian Gulf.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov underscored these realities of the
new regional order when he called on the big powers recently to "put
concrete proposals on the table guaranteeing the security of Iran and
ensuring Iran a worthy, equal place in talks on resolving all problems in
the Near and Middle East."
Lavrov is not alone in doing some fast-forward thinking. US specialists also
realize the need for new thinking regarding the shaping of a nuclear Iran.
Essentially, it boils down to reflecting the limits of American power. A
leading US expert on Iran, Ray Takeyh a senior fellow at the influential
Council on Foreign Relations, took the bull by the horns when he suggested
recently that the time had come for the US to "concede to Iranian indigenous
enrichment capability of considerable size" and to concentrate instead on
ways and means to make certain that "untoward activities" do not take place
within the perimeters of its nuclear infrastructure.
Takeyh wrote last week while Bush was in Iran's neighborhood, "Iran has an
elaborate nuclear apparatus and is enriching uranium. It is impossible to
turn the clock back. Instead of reviving an incentive package rejected long
ago by Iran or issuing calls for military retribution that worry no one in
the country's hierarchy, the United States and its European allies would be
wise to negotiate an arrangement that would meet at least some of their
demands."
True, oil and nuclear proliferation make a serious mix. But they form only
one facet of the breakdown of the Bush administration's Iran strategy. The
breakdown is comprehensive. During his tour, Bush kept trying to secure
support for his containment policy toward Iran. However, the regional
countries remain circumspect. Iraq's Arab neighbors refuse to get involved
in the quagmire in that country despite their constant wailing that Iranian
influence in Iraq has reached an intolerable level. They won't allow
themselves being lined up with any further efforts by the Bush
administration to confront Iran. While criticizing Iran in private to their
American interlocutors and urging US counter-measures, they hedge their
bets, factoring that the next US president might well engage Iran in
unconditional talks.
The developments in Lebanon have further exposed that the Bush
administration has no effective plan for coping. If the Washington-based
newsletter Counterpunch is to be believed, a pre-planned Israeli
intervention (with US acquiescence) in Lebanon during the recent fighting
had to be called off at the last minute on the basis of intelligence that
Hezbollah would massively retaliate. In the view of the US intelligence
community, Tel Aviv would have been subject to "approximately 600 Hezbollah
rockets in the first 24 hours in retaliation".
Counterpunch says the Bush administration developed cold feet after it
"initially green-lighted" plans regarding Israeli military intervention on
the side of the US-backed militias. "The Hezbollah rout of the militias in
West Beirut plus the fear of retaliation on Tel Aviv, forced cancelation of
the supportive [Israeli] attack."
Unsurprisingly, there is much anger and bitterness among Lebanese warlords
that they were let down by the Bush administration. Prime Minister Fuad
al-Siniora wanted to resign and the Saudis had to dissuade him from doing
so. The result is plain to see. The political balance has shifted in favor
of the Hezbollah and the pro-West militias have been humiliated. Most
important, an improbable alliance formed between the Hezbollah and the
Lebanese army (which the Bush administration assisted to the tune of $400
million in the past two-year period).
The regional implications are equally significant. Saudi Arabia and Egypt
are backing Arab League mediation efforts, distancing themselves from the US
denunciations of Iran and Syria. The two Arab heavyweights would be uneasy
about the lengthening shadows of Iranian influence on Lebanon, but they
realize at the same time that Iran is a regional power with which they need
to come to terms.
To quote well-known British author and Middle East scholar Patrick Seale,
"The Arab Gulf States in particular trade briskly with Iran and are home to
a large Iranian population. They do not want to isolate Iran or undermine
its economy, as the United States and Israel would like them to do. It seems
clear that greater understanding and confidence between Saudi Arabia and
Egypt on the one hand and Iran and Syria on the other - free from US and
Israeli interference - would do much to ease Lebanon's path to peace and
security."
In sum, the Bush administration has no Plan B on Lebanon, either. The Arab
League mediation coolly ignored Washington's keenness to open a Lebanon file
in the United Nations Security Council and to pillory Syria and Iran. All
that the US officials could do was to keep mumbling skepticism concerning
the prospects of the intra-Lebanese talks in Doha under the Arab League.
However, the US's failure in rolling back Syrian and Iranian influence in
Lebanon pales in comparison with the withering away of the US-sponsored
Arab-Israeli "peace process". The latter hung like an albatross's cross on
Bush's Middle East tour. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' credibility
has greatly suffered; Fatah has been eliminated from Gaza; Hamas is
significantly gaining ground in the West Bank after its consolidation in
Gaza. Thus, there were no takers when Bush told the Arab audience in Sharm
el-Sheikh, Egypt, on Friday, "All nations in the region must stand together
in confronting Hamas, which is attempting to undermine efforts at peace with
continued acts of terror and violence."
The Arabs knew that at any rate, there is an air of unreality in Bush's
anti-Hamas rhetoric. Hamas had announced only a couple of days ago that it
would send a delegation to Egypt on Monday for a new round of talks with
mediators. The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz reported on Sunday that several
former Israeli military and security officials - including ex-Mossad head
Ephraim Halevi, former army chief Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and the former
commander of Israeli troops in Gaza, Shmuel Zakai - wrote to the government
a month ago supporting indirect talks with Hamas and expressing opposition
to any large-scale military assault on Gaza.
They wrote, "Recognizing that ending the Hamas regime in Gaza is not a
realistic goal and reinstating Fatah in the Gaza Strip by means of Israeli
bayonets is not desirable ... non-public negotiations should take place with
Hamas through Egypt or anyone else acceptable to both sides."
Time and again during Bush's Middle East tour, what emerges is this palpable
sense that the US has been all but marginalized from a new Middle East that
is taking shape. All of Bush's rhetoric couldn't hide the fact that even by
adding 300 million Americans to 7 million Israelis, he failed to disprove
the erosion in Israel's regional supremacy.
In a brilliant article recently, former German foreign minister Joschka
Fischer underlined that the center of gravity of the regional power and
politics in the wake of the Iraq war has shifted to the Persian Gulf. To
quote Fischer, "Indeed, it is now virtually impossible to implement any
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without Iran and its local
allies - Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine."
The point is, the historic failure of the Iraq war is yet to be fully
grasped. On a regional plane, as the Iraq war interminably rolls on, the
situation is fraught with the immense consequence of the unraveling of the
entire system of states that was created in the Anglo-French settlement
after the fall of Ottoman Empire in 1918. The Iraq war has triggered Shi'ite
empowerment and unleashed historical forces that lay chained for centuries.
Its geopolitical significance is yet to sink in as winds of change sweep
across the entire region.
Fischer underscored that the Iraq war has conclusively finished off secular
Arab nationalism, which was, historically speaking, European-inspired. In
its wake has appeared political Islam, which cultivates "anti-Western"
nationalism and taps into social, economic and cultural grievances and
combines them with a revolutionary fervor to confront the authoritarian,
corrupt, unjust regimes lacking popular legitimacy. Islamists pilot this
trend of "modernization", while the future of political Islam itself remains
far from clear.
Equally, China has appeared on the Middle Eastern chessboard, which would
make the decline in the US dominance of the region increasingly difficult to
be arrested. Curiously, on the eve of Bush's arrival in the Middle East, a
prominent Chinese scholar, Weiming Zhao, professor at the Middle East
Studies Institute of the Shanghai International Studies University,
assertively wrote: "China has a significant interest in the Middle East, and
any changes in the situation there will affect China's energy security ...
Therefore, it will remain a basic posture of China's diplomacy for a long
time to come to pay more attention to the development of the situation in
the Middle East, to be more concerned with Middle East affairs and to
establish closer relations with Middle East countries."
Bush's tour exposed that, alas, the US doesn't have a Middle East strategy
to address these manifold trends. It seems all the while, the Bush
administration was only pretending it had one. A formidable challenge awaits
the next US president.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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