[GJM] New Green Century

[Yaseen]

Dear Dear Dr.Alam,

Your article has been posted on our forum at www.gv2000.com/forum at the section on the PNAC.
We look forward to your responses to this important
debate.

Regards

Moeen Yaseen  


 
---------- Original Message ----------------------------------
From: Muhammad Mukhtar Alam <mukhtaralam2000 at yahoo.com>
Reply-To: mukhtaralam2000 at yahoo.com, Discussion Forum for Global Justice<discussion at globaljusticemovement.net>
Date:  Tue, 25 Jul 2006 23:06:20 -0700 (PDT)

>This is the new Green Century and that is what I would like to work for ..
>   
>  Ecologically hostile responses of the American presidents over the last 10 years, continued insolence, moral depravity does not quality US to be the leader..
>   
>  We must work for The NEW GREEN CENTURY...WITH ECOLOGICAL SAFETY AND COLLECTIVE WELLBEING
>  Dr.Muhammad Mukhtar Alam
>   
>   
>  
>
>Sukla Sen <suklasenp at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>          I/III.
>http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/186en.htm
>
>Commentary No. 186, June 1, 2006
>
>"Whose Century is the 21st Century?"
>
>In 1941, Henry Luce proclaimed the twentieth century
>the American century. And most analysts have agreed
>with him ever since. Of course, the twentieth century
>was more than merely the American century. It was the
>century of the decolonization of Asia and Africa. It
>was the century of the flourishing of both fascism and
>communism as political movements. And it was the
>century of both the Great Depression and the
>incredible, unprecedented expansion of the
>world-economy in the 25 years after the end of the
>Second World War.
>
>But nonetheless, it was the American century. The
>United States became the unquestioned hegemonic power
>in the period 1945-1970 and shaped a world-system to
>its liking. The United States became the premier
>economic producer, the dominant political force, and
>the cultural center of the world-system. The United
>States, in short, ran the show, at least for a while.
>
>Now, the United States is in visible decline. More and
>more analysts are willing to say this openly, even if
>the official line of the U.S. establishment is to deny
>this vigorously, just as a certain portion of the
>world left insists on the continued hegemony of the
>United States. But clear-minded realists on all sides
>recognize that the U.S. star is growing dimmer. The
>question that underlies all serious prognostication is
>then, whose century is the twenty-first century?
>
>Of course, it is only 2006, and a bit early to answer
>this question with any sense of certainty. But
>nonetheless, political leaders everywhere are making
>bets on the answer and shaping their policies
>accordingly. If we rephrase the question to ask merely
>what may the world look like in, for example, 2025, we
>may at least be able to say something intelligent.
>
>There are basically three sets of answers to the
>question of what the world will look like in 2025. The
>first is that the United States will enjoy one last
>fling, a revival of power, and will continue to rule
>the roost in the absence of any serious military
>contender. The second is that China will displace the
>United States as the world's superpower. The third is
>that the world will become an arena of anarchic and
>relatively unpredictable multi-polar disorder. Let us
>examine the plausibility of each of these three
>predictions.
>
>The United States on top? There are three reasons to
>doubt this. The first, an economic reason, is the
>fragility of the U.S. dollar as the sole reserve
>currency in the world-economy. The dollar is sustained
>now by massive infusions of bond purchases by Japan,
>China, Korea, and other countries. It is highly
>unlikely that this will continue. When the dollar
>falls dramatically, it may momentarily increase the
>sale of manufactured goods, but the United States will
>lose its command on world wealth and its ability to
>expand the deficit without serious immediate penalty.
>The standard of living will fall and there will be an
>influx of new reserve currencies, including the euro
>and the yen.
>
>The second reason is military. Both Afghanistan and
>especially Iraq have demonstrated in the last few
>years that it is not enough to have airplanes, ships,
>and bombs. A nation must also have a very large land
>force to overcome local resistance. The United States
>does not have such a force, and will not have one, due
>to internal political reasons. Hence, it is doomed to
>lose such wars.
>
>The third reason is political. Nations throughout the
>world are drawing the logical conclusion that they can
>now defy the United States politically. Take the
>latest instance: The Shanghai Cooperation
>Organization, which brings together Russia, China, and
>four Central Asian republics, is about to expand to
>include India, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Iran. Iran has
>been invited at the very moment that the United States
>is trying to organize a worldwide campaign against the
>regime. The Boston Globe has called this correctly "an
>anti-Bush alliance" and a "tectonic shift in
>geopolitics."
>
>Will China then emerge on top by 2025? To be sure,
>China is doing quite well economically, is expanding
>its military force considerably, and is even beginning
>to play a serious political role in regions far from
>its borders. China will undoubtedly be much stronger
>in 2025; however, China faces three problems that it
>must overcome.
>
>The first problem is internal. China is not
>politically stabilized. The one-party structure has
>the force of economic success and nationalist
>sentiment in its favor. But it faces the discontent of
>about half of the population that has been left
>behind, and the discontent of the other half about the
>limits on their internal political freedom.
>
>China's second problem concerns the world-economy. The
>incredible expansion of consumption in China (along
>with that of India) will take its toll both on the
>world's ecology and on the possibilities of capital
>accumulation. Too many consumers and too many
>producers will have severe repercussions on worldwide
>profit levels.
>
>The third problem lies with China's neighbors. Were
>China to accomplish the reintegration of Taiwan, help
>arrange the reunification of the Koreas, and come to
>terms (psychologically and politically) with Japan,
>there might be an East Asian unified geopolitical
>structure that could assume a hegemonic position.
>
>All three of these problems can be overcome, but it
>will not be easy. And the odds that China can overcome
>these difficulties by 2025 are uncertain.
>
>The last scenario is that of multi-polar anarchy and
>wild economic fluctuations. Given the inability of
>maintaining an old hegemonic power, the difficulty of
>establishing a new one, and the crisis in worldwide
>capital accumulation, this third scenario appears the
>most likely.
>
>by Immanuel Wallerstein
>
>II/III.
>http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/187en.htm
>
>Commentary No. 187, June 15, 2006
>
>"How Has Latin America Moved Left?"
>
>The discussion on the leftward trend of Latin America
>in recent years reflects all the confusion, worldwide,
>about what it means to be on the left in the
>twenty-first century. The confusion is among all wings
>of world political opinion. There are various
>explanations for this confusion. The most obvious
>reason is that different people are measuring
>different things as the criterion of moving left. The
>second is that no such political tendency is perfectly
>linear. It always reflects ups and downs, but that
>doesn't mean that there isn't an overall trend. And
>the third reason is that politicians notoriously speak
>multiple languages to different audiences, but that
>doesn't mean one cannot discern bottom lines.
>
>The first thing to distinguish among criteria is
>whether we are speaking of a given regime's position
>on geopolitical issues or their internal policies. Of
>course the two are linked. But nonetheless regimes are
>not necessarily consistent. For Latin America the main
>geopolitical issue is their attitude towards and
>relationship with the United States. There seems
>little question that, on this issue, the vast majority
>of Latin American states have moved a considerable
>distance since 2000. One only has to ask the U.S.
>Department of State about it. They are quite aware
>that their voice is no longer heard with the respect
>and fear it once was. This is more than a matter of
>Chavez's strident tones. We can see this even in the
>volatile actions and largely centrist views of the
>present government in Ecuador. The fact is that openly
>rightwing candidates do not win elections any more,
>except in Colombia. This simply wasn't true as
>recently as a decade ago.
>
>The second thing to look at is the position of the
>various regimes on questions relating to the World
>Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary
>Fund (IMF), and the multiple propositions for free
>trade agreements offered by the United States. If the
>WTO is stymied in its present negotiations, if the IMF
>matters a lot less than it did a decade ago, and if
>the United States can get nowhere in the proposed Free
>Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), it is in large part
>due to the numerous "left-of-center" governments in
>Latin America which have put obstacles in their way.
>This is not the doing of Cuba but of Brazil and
>Argentina. Even in Peru, the newly-elected very
>centrist president, Alan Garcia, who defeated Ollanta
>Humala (openly endorsed by Chavez), said in his first
>post-victory declaration that he was going to review
>critically every clause of the bilateral free trade
>agreement the previous Peruvian government had been
>negotiating with the United States.
>
>Those who criticize the various new Latin American
>regimes from the left tend to emphasize what they have
>been doing internally more than their geopolitical
>stances. There are several critical "internal" issues.
>The first is the rights of the so-called indigenous
>populations. This has been a political issue in Latin
>American countries for over two centuries. But it is
>only today that there is beginning to be a
>breakthrough in terms of their rights. This is in
>large part the result of the increased consciousness
>and political mobilization of these populations.
>
>Of course, this varies country by country. And the
>power of indigenous populations is in part related to
>their demographic strength. Still, notice what has
>been happening. Presidential candidates of indigenous
>origins have been elected in a number of countries.
>Their mobilization was a crucial factor in the
>election of Evo Morales, himself of these origins, in
>Bolivia. Their mobilization has made it difficult for
>Ecuador to stay in its traditionally rightwing
>political position. We need scarcely mention the
>obvious case of Mexico, which now lives and operates
>within the context of a situation changed
>fundamentally by the Zapatista rebellion. Even in a
>country which has a rather small percentage of
>indigenous peoples, such as Chile, their struggle has
>now become a major issue with which the government
>must contend.
>
>The second issue, often closely allied to the first
>one, is that of land reform. Here the left critics of
>the concept of a leftward turn have probably their
>strongest case. The fact is that the Brazilian Partido
>dos Trabalhadores (PT) has in effect reneged on its
>pledges to carry out some significant reform. And, in
>consequence, its crucial supporter, the Movimento dos
>Sem Terras (MST), has moved further and further away
>from the PT. But the new Bolivian government has just
>announced that it will move forward on land reform.
>And if it does, this should create a big boost for
>such movements in other countries.
>
>The third internal issue is the control of natural
>resources (not only mining and energy but water). This
>doesn't always mean outright nationalization but it
>certainly means a significant degree of state control
>and a significant national retention of income
>generated. Here too, bit by bit, albeit often slowly,
>there has been movement. One need only read the
>screams about protectionism to see that this is a
>reality with which multinationals know they have to
>come to terms today. In past decades, they could
>easily arrange friendly coups d'état. This has become
>very difficult, as Venezuela has demonstrated.
>
>The fourth internal issue is the degree to which the
>new regimes allocate significant additional resources
>to education at all levels and to health-related
>structures. Here too, as with land reform, the results
>so far have been limited, although one of the reasons
>has been lack of governmental resources, something
>which may be overcome by measures in other domains. We
>have to reserve judgment on this account.
>
>Finally, there is the question of the degree to which
>the military is being constrained from direct
>interference in the national decision-making
>processes. Latin America today is very different
>indeed from the epoch, not so long ago, of military
>coups supported by the United States, and military
>regimes specializing in torture. Indeed, the amnesties
>that the military arranged for themselves when they
>returned to the barracks are being revoked, slowly and
>carefully but up to this point successfully.
>
>So, what is the overall picture? Latin America has
>definitely moved left from where it was. Whether this
>will continue and amplify in the next decade is a
>function both of the evolving world geopolitical
>picture and the degree to which left social movements
>within Latin America will maintain cohesion and put
>forward lucid programs.
>
>by Immanuel Wallerstein
>
>III/III.
>
>http://www.irc-online.org/content/3296
>
>Rise and Demise of the "New American Century" 
>Tom Barry, IRC | June 28, 2006
>
>International Relations Center
>
>The glory days of the Project for the New American
>Century (PNAC) quickly passed.
>When neoconservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan
>formed PNAC in 1997, they
>aimed to set forth a new agenda for post-Cold War
>foreign and military policy
>that would ensure that the United States could claim
>the 21 st century as its
>own--where U.S. military dominance would not only
>protect U.S. national security
>and national interests but would also establish a
>global Pax Americana. The
>election of George W. Bush opened the door to the
>Pentagon, vice president's
>office, State Department, and the National Security
>Council for PNAC associates,
>many of whom--including Richard Cheney, Donald
>Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, and Paul
>Wolfowitz--became the leading figures in the Bush
>administration's foreign policy
>team. Although not all were neoconservatives
>themselves, the PNAC associates 
>brought neoconservative ideology and a common
>conviction of U.S. supremacy with
>them into
>government. However, it was not until Sept. 11 that
>the PNAC-dominated foreign
>policy team got its chance to fast-forward their
>plans to remake the world as a
>U.S. dominion. 
>Back in 2001 and even into 2002 few Americans--even
>in foreign policy
>circles--knew about the Project for the New American
>Century or could speak
>knowledgeably about the history and ideological
>convictions of neoconservatives.
>Nearly five years after Sept. 11 and more than three
>years after the U.S.
>invasion of Iraq, most Americans who follow foreign
>policy and U.S. politics are
>familiar with the term neoconservative and probably
>have heard about the Project
>for the New American Century. 
>As the wars and occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan
>have become quagmires, the
>glory days of PNAC have been cut short by the limits
>of U.S. power and the
>follies of the Bush administration's arrogance. Yet 
>by no means is it certain if
>the lessons of PNAC's successes and delusions have
>been learned, either by the
>U.S. public or the U.S. policy community. The agenda
>set out by PNAC in its 1997
>"Statement of Principles" reflects the exceptionalism
>and supremacy that still 
>pervades this country. And many of PNAC's policy
>prescriptions regarding regime
>change, increased U.S. military budgets, unilateral 
>action, and America's moral
>mission remain part of the common political 
>discourse. 
>By 2005 PNAC began to fade from the political
>landscape, and though the website
>is still functioning, it has been dormant since late
>that year. But the
>neoconservatives, together with their Religious Right
>and military-industrial
>complex allies, remain prominent actors in shaping 
>the directions of U.S. foreign
>and military policy--some within government and
>others from a wide array of
>neocon-led think tanks, front groups, and policy
>institutes. 
>The IRC is publishing this special report on the
>Project for the New American
>Century, along with an accompanying report on the
>Committee on the Present Danger,
>as part of an effort to stimulate more reflection on
>the dangers of the ideology
>and political projects of the neoconservatives and
>their allies. 
>>From an office in the same building that houses
>the American Enterprise
>Institute (AEI) in downtown Washington and with
>funding from the Bradley
>Foundation, William Kristol established the Project
>for the Republican Future
>in 1993 in anticipation of the 1994 congressional
>elections. Following the 
>resounding victory of right-wing Republicans, he
>founded the Weekly Standard in
>1995 in the vacated offices of the Project for the
>Republican Future. The next
>year Kristol and Robert Kagan established the Project 
>for the New American
>Century, whose offices are also located in the 
>American Enterprise Institute
>building and which is also generously supported by
>the Bradley Foundation.1
>By the time Kristol and Kagan formulated the idea
>for the Project for the New 
>American Century in 1996, the widespread conservative
>frustration at having to
>endure another four years of Clinton liberals had
>largely papered over the
>conservative rift of the late 1980s. Newt Gingrich's 
>"Contract with America"
>played a key role in unifying conservatives around an
>almost exclusively
>domestic agenda of big-government bashing, glorifying
>in traditional family
>values, and attacking secular humanism. The domestic
>side of a reinvigorated
>right wing was coming together nicely in the 1990s,
>as seen in the winning role
>played by the "Contract with America" in ushering in
>a Republican majority in
>both houses of Congress under the Clinton presidency.
>
>The right, however, had not recovered from the
>loss of its chief mobilizing 
>principle: militant anticommunism. Central to the
>right's role in winning the
>White House for Ronald Reagan in 1980 was the fusion
>of three core conservative
>constituencies: social conservatives, economic 
>libertarians, and national
>security militarists. In the late 1970s, 
>neoconservatives played a key
>strategic role in engineering this right-wing fusion,
>providing many of the key
>intellectual and ideological frameworks for the right
>wing's expanding 
>counter-establishment and for the right-wing
>populists. 
>If they were to reprise this same unifying role
>in the late 1990s, the neocons
>knew that the old political messages daring the
>Democrats to associate 
>themselves with the "L" word of liberalism would no
>longer suffice. Positioning
>themselves as New Democrats, Bill Clinton and Al Gore
>had stolen the
>neoconservative thunder on free market and big
>government issues. 
>The challenge was to create a "neo-Reaganite"
>agenda--one that would appeal to
>the same "moral majority" citizens who were still
>fighting the backlash 
>cultural wars against multiculturalism and the
>counterculture of the 1960s, who
>responded to messaging about moral clarity and
>America's mission, and whose
>sense of patriotism and nationalism could again be 
>rallied to support increased
>military spending and interventionism abroad.
>Collectively, the
>neoconservatives, the Republican Party's hawks, and
>the social conservatives
>aimed to awaken America from its slumber to wage the
>'good fight against the
>forces of evil' that were gathering round the world.
>PNAC's founding statement
>in 1997 crystallized this new sense of America's
>power and moral mission. 
>PNAC's 1997 "Statement of Principles" set forth a
>new agenda for foreign and 
>military policy that was described by William Kristol
>and Robert Kagan as being
>"neo-Reaganite." Signatories of this charter document
>said that they aimed "to
>make the case and rally support for American global 
>leadership."2 Excerpts from
>the statement follow: 
>"We seem to have forgotten the essential elements
>of the Reagan
>administration's success: a military that is strong
>and ready to meet both
>present and future challenges; a foreign policy that
>boldly and purposefully 
>promotes American principles abroad; and national
>leadership that accepts the
>United States' global responsibilities." 
>"Of course, the United States must be prudent in
>how it exercises its power.
>But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of
>global leadership or the 
>costs that are associated with its exercise. America
>has a vital role in
>maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and
>the Middle East. If we
>shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to
>our fundamental interests.
>The history of the 20th century should have taught us
>that it is important to
>shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet
>threats before they
>become dire. The history of this century should have
>taught us to embrace the
>cause of American leadership." 
>"Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and
>moral clarity may not be 
>fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United
>States is to build on the
>successes of this past century and to ensure our
>security and our greatness in
>the next." 
>Liberals and progressives might regard the
>success of the Project for the New 
>American Century setting a new foreign policy agenda
>as an example of how the
>right's unity, its messaging skills, its networking,
>and the focused political
>agenda of its small circle of foundations have 
>enabled it to effect radical
>political change. Recalling the group's origins in
>the mid-1990s, PNAC's
>executive director Gary Schmitt told a different
>story: "It is actually just
>the opposite. We started up precisely because the
>right was so divided--between
>the realists and the neo-isolationists." According to
>Schmitt, "What we thought
>was that a tradition that was both more American and
>more particularly
>Reaganite had been dropped from the agenda."3
>That agenda--one of U.S. moral clarity and the
>exercise of American power
>against evil--was articulated in 1996 by Bill Kristol
>and Robert Kagan in their
>Foreign Affairs essay on creating a "neo-Reaganite"
>foreign policy agenda.4
>PNAC, said Schmitt, was the result of Kristol and
>Kagan's decision to
>"institutionalize" their vision. 
>The Project for the New American Century struck a
>discordant note in the
>dominant political discourse. At a time when most
>pundits and politicians were 
>caught up in national debates about the price of
>prescription drugs, the future
>of social security, and the impact of globalization,
>PNAC warned of "present
>dangers" to U.S. national security. 
>On the whole, however, PNAC's associates--many of
>whom joined the
>administration of George W. Bush--were hopeful. If
>conservatives would continue
>to resist "isolationist impulses from within their
>own ranks" and if a new 
>government would adopt the history-tested principle of
>"peace through 
>strength," the "greatness" of the United States would
>be ensured in the next
>century. If the American people were to again embrace
>"a Reaganite policy of
>military strength and moral clarity," they could look
>forward to a New American
>Century.5
>The rhetoric, political tactics, and assumptions
>about America's moral mission 
>articulated by the Project for the New American
>Century all had deep historical
>resonance. The three signature features of the Project
>for the New American
>Century--the coalition-building to confront the 
>"present danger," the vision of
>a planetary Pax Americana, and the laying of a
>nationalist claim to an entire
>century--were echoes of former visionaries,
>statesmen, and political leaders. 
>In raising the alarm about the present danger,
>PNAC sounded again the refrain
>of post-WWII militarists and internationalists. Since
>the late 1940s, factions
>of the U.S. foreign policy elite have stoked the
>patriotism and paranoia of
>Americans with warnings about the "present danger" 
>facing the United States if
>lulled to sleep by dovish political and economic
>elites. For hawks and
>ideologues, the term "present danger," along with the
>phrase "peace through
>strength," has been the recurrent rallying cry of
>those arguing for a more
>aggressive national security strategy. 
>In the advent of the 2000 presidential election,
>PNAC's founders William Kristol
>and Robert Kagan in their edited book Present Dangers 
>invoked the words of
>Henry Robinson Luce, who had even before the United
>States entered World War II
>predicted that the 20 th century could be the
>"American Century" if it created
>"an international moral order."6 The combination of
>military strength, "a
>vital international economic order" established by
>the United States, and
>foreign policy guided by America's God-ordained moral
>mission would, according
>to Luce, ensure American supremacy and international
>peace.7
>The Team with the Right Stuff PNAC embodied 
>the new right-wing fusionism of
>the late 1990s and Bush II presidency, melding the
>various tendencies in the
>neoconservative camp with leading social
>conservatives and national security
>hawks. 
>PNAC succeeded in integrating the various
>tendencies and diverse expertise
>found within neoconservatism, uniting political
>intellectuals associated with 
>neocon publications (Norman Podhoretz and William
>Kristol), scholars (Eliot
>Cohen and Francis Fukuyama), military strategists
>(Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay
>Khalilzad), and cultural/religious warriors (William
>Bennett and George Weigel).
>
>Among its 27 founding members, including cochairs
>Kristol and Kagan, only a
>handful of individuals didn't match the
>neoconservative prototype, although all
>shared in the agendas and new ideological vision of
>American supremacism as
>articulated by the neocon political and military 
>strategists. 
>The two most prominent in the small number of
>exceptions--Dick Cheney and
>Donald Rumsfeld--were national security hard-liners
>who had worked their way 
>up in the Republican Party. Unlike neocon political
>intellectuals, who prefer
>to guide policy with their ideologies rather than to
>attain political power as
>elected officials, both Rumsfeld and Cheney worked 
>together at the Office of
>Economic Opportunity in the Ford administration--and
>both established a
>political base in the Republican Party as
>congressional representatives. 
>Both men had quickly gravitated to the
>military-industrial complex--first as
>strong supporters of higher military budgets while in
>Congress, later as 
>secretaries of defense and also as directors of and
>investors in major Pentagon
>contractors. Rumsfeld and Cheney were closely tied to
>the economic interests in
>U.S. foreign and military policy. Both had close ties
>with the globalizing
>military-industrial complex, high-tech industries,
>and energy businesses. Both
>Cheney and Rumsfeld were corporate CEOs when they
>signed the PNAC charter. 
>During their years in politics and business,
>Rumsfeld and Cheney had forged
>close alliances with neoconservatives. Rumsfeld, for
>example, was fundraising 
>chairman of Midge Decter's Committee for the Free
>World, and Cheney as defense
>secretary chose neoconservatives as his closest 
>advisers as he did in 1992 when
>directing the creation of a new Defense Policy
>Guidance for the Pentagon. 
>Albeit sparsely represented, right-wing social
>conservatives closely associated
>with the Christian Right constituted another
>important sector in the PNAC 
>coalition. Among those representing the social
>conservative faction were Gary
>Bauer, former director of the Family Research Council
>and current president of
>American Values; former Vice President Dan Quayle; and
>two other prominent
>cultural warriors: Steve Forbes and cofounder of
>Empower America ,former
>Representative Vin Weber. 
>Forbes, the quintessential corporate
>conservative, was also a former Empower 
>America director and is associated with other
>right-wing social conservative
>and economic libertarian institutes. In 2002 Forbes,
>with his neocon
>colleagues, was a founding director of the Foundation
>for the Defense of
>Democracies (FDD) . As PNAC continued through 2005 to
>issue new public 
>declarations, it maintained its strong neoconservative
>backbone while 
>integrating top figures from other sectors of the
>right wing's power complex
>and occasionally a sprinkling of liberal hawks. 
>Many of the signatories of PNAC's "Statement of
>Principles" joined the Bush
>administration. Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, I.
>Lewis Libby, and Paul
>Wolfowitz became key players in setting the
>administration's foreign and
>military policy. Other PNAC charter signatories who
>joined the administration
>as foreign and military policy officials were: Elliott
>Abrams, special
>assistant to the president and senior director for
>Near East and North African
>affairs at the National Security Council; Paula
>Dobriansky, undersecretary of
>State for Global Affairs; Aaron Friedberg, Vice
>President Cheney's deputy
>national security adviser; Zalmay Khalilzad,
>ambassador to Afghanistan and
>currently ambassador to Iraq; and Peter Rodman,
>assistant secretary of defense
>for International Affairs. 
>Other signatories of PNAC's "Statement of
>Principles" joined the administration
>as advisers or became members of the National
>Endowment for Democracy (NED).
>Eliot Cohen, Dan Quayle, Henry Rowen, and Fred Iklé 
>became members of
>Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board. Vin Weber became 
>NED's chairman, while Francis
>Fukuyama became a NED board member, and was appointed
>to serve on the
>administration's Commission on Bioethics. 
>PNAC Profile The Project for the New
>American Century was established in
>the spring of 1997 as a nonprofit organization "whose
>goal is to promote 
>American global leadership." PNAC is an initiative of
>the New Citizenship
>Project, whose chairman is William Kristol. PNAC
>describes itself as a
>"nonprofit educational organization supporting
>American military,
>diplomatic, and moral leadership." It has been
>inactive since late 2005. 
>PNAC's board of directors has the following members,
>as listed on its website
>(May 26, 2006): William Kristol (chairman), Robert
>Kagan, Bruce Jackson, Mark
>Gerson, and Randy Scheunemann. Staff members: Ellen
>Bork (acting executive
>director), Gary Schmitt (senior fellow), Thomas
>Donnelly (senior fellow), Reuel
>Gerecht (director of the Middle East Initiative),
>Timothy Lehman, (assistant
>director), and Michael Goldfarb (research associate).8
>Between 2000 and 2003, PNAC received $170,000 in
>grants from several
>conservative foundations, including the Earhart, Olin,
>and William J. Donner
>foundations.9 From 1994 to 2004, the New Citizenship
>Project that sponsors PNAC
>and whose chairman is PNAC's William Kristol received
>$3.3 million in grants,
>mainly from the largest right-wing foundations:
>Bradley, Olin, and Scaife
>Foundations. The Bradley Foundation has been PNAC's
>largest source of foundation 
>support, granting PNAC $700,000 in 1997-2004. In its
>first year of operations,
>PNAC received grants from Bradley, Sarah Scaife, and
>Olin foundations.10
>PNAC Letters and Statements (1998-2003) 
>Following its "Statement of
>Principles," PNAC organized several reports and
>sign-on letters
>critical of the Clinton administration's foreign and
>military policies.
>These PNAC letters paralleled initiatives by the
>Republican majority in
>Congress to pressure Clinton to increase the military 
>budget, implement
>a missile defense system, and switch to a more 
>confrontational foreign
>policy that targeted rogue states. A January 1998
>letter to Clinton
>contended that the only "acceptable policy" vis-à-vis
>Iraq was "one
>that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be
>able to use or
>threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the 
>near term, this
>means a willingness to undertake military action, as 
>diplomacy is
>clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing 
>Saddam Hussein and
>his regime from power. That now needs to become the 
>aim of American
>foreign policy."11
>During the Clinton presidency, PNAC organized two
>sign-on letters to the
>president (the second one on Milosevic) and one
>letter to congressional leaders
>(on Iraq), and it published one statement (on the
>"Defense of Taiwan").12 In
>2000 PNAC also published a book and a report, both of
>which were designed as
>blueprints for a new U.S. foreign and military policy.
>The book Present Dangers
>was edited by Robert Kagan and William Kristol and
>included many PNAC associates
>and other neoconservatives. Rebuilding America's
>Defenses, written largely by
>PNAC's Thomas Donnelly, offered an agenda for 
>military transformation based on
>the Defense Policy Guidance of 1992, the national
>security strategy written by
>Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad
>under the supervision of
>then-Defense Secretary Cheney. 
>The election of George W. Bush enabled PNAC to
>fast-forward its agenda for the
>"new American century." Many PNAC principals moved
>into the Pentagon, vice 
>president's office, and State Department. It was not,
>however, until after
>Sept. 11 that the PNAC agenda was finally implemented.
>
>On Sept. 20, 2001 PNAC sent a an open-letter to
>President Bush that commended
>his newly declared war on terrorism and urged him not
>only to target Osama bin
>Laden but also other "perpetrators," including Saddam
>Hussein and Hezbollah.
>The letter made one of the first arguments for regime
>change in Iraq as part of
>the war on terror. According to the PNAC letter, "It 
>may be that the Iraqi
>government provided assistance in some form to the
>recent attack on the United
>States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq
>directly to the attack, any
>strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and
>its sponsors must include a
>determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power
>in Iraq. Failure to 
>undertake such an effort will constitute an early and
>perhaps decisive 
>surrender in the war on international terrorism." 
>The letter also pointed out that to undertake
>this new war, it would be
>necessary to inject more money into the nation's
>defense budget: "A serious and
>victorious war on terrorism will require a large
>increase in defense spending.
>Fighting this war may well require the United States
>to engage a well-armed
>foe, and will also require that we remain capable of
>defending our interests
>elsewhere in the world. We urge that there be no
>hesitation in requesting
>whatever funds for defense are needed to allow us to
>win this war." 
>Including the first PNAC letter on the war on
>terrorism, PNAC published four
>letters to Bush in 2001-2003. In April 2002 PNAC sent
>a letter to Bush on 
>"Israel and the War on Terrorism." This was followed
>on November 25, 2002 by a
>letter on Hong Kong, and then a January 23, 2003
>letter on increasing the
>military budget. In March 2003, PNAC published two 
>statements on "Post-War
>Iraq."13
>Latest from PNAC The most recent PNAC letter
>or statement was a January 28,
>2005 letter addressed to congressional leaders
>requesting that they "take the
>steps necessary to increase substantially the size of
>the active duty Army and
>Marine Corps." It was the judgment of the PNAC
>letter's signatories that an 
>increase of 25,000 troops a year would be necessary to
>meet what Condoleezza
>Rice described as the country's "generational
>commitment" to fighting terrorism
>in the greater Middle East. 
>According to the PNAC letter, "The administration
>has been reluctant to adapt
>to this new reality." But the PNAC signatories
>countered: "We understand the 
>dangers of continued federal deficits, and the fiscal
>difficulty of increasing
>the number of troops. But the defense of the United
>States is the first
>priority of the government." 
>The signatories of the January 2005 letter were:
>Peter Beinart, Jeffrey Bergner,
>Daniel Blumenthal, Max Boot, Eliot Cohen, Ivo Daalder,
>Thomas Donnelly, Michele
>Fournoy, Frank Gaffney, Reuel Gerecht, Lt. Gen. Buster
>Glosson (ret.), Bruce
>Jackson, Frederick Kagan, Robert Kagan, Craig Kennedy,
>Paul Kennedy, Col. Robert
>Killebrew (ret.), William Kristol, Will Marshall,
>Clifford May, Gen. Barry
>McCaffrey (ret.), Daniel McKivergan, Joshua Muravchik,
>Steven Nider, Michael
>O'Hanlon, Mackubin Thomas Owens, Ralph Peters,
>Danielle Pletka, Stephen Rosen,
>Maj. Gen. Robert Scales (ret.), Randy Scheunemann,
>Gary Schmitt, Walter
>Slocombe, James Steinberg, and James Woolsey. 
>Although many of the signatories belong to the
>usual circle of neocons--such as
>Boot, Cohen, Donnelly, Gaffney, Gerecht, the Kagans,
>May, Muravchik, Schmitt, 
>and Woolsey--other signatories were such liberal hawks
>and liberal 
>internationalists as Beinart, Marshall, Paul Kennedy,
>James Steinberg, and
>Michael O'Hanlon.14
>Several months before, PNAC published an "Open
>Letter to the Heads of State and
>Government of the European Union and NATO" expressing
>concern about the 
>domestic and foreign policies of the Putin government
>in Russia. The Sept. 28,
>2004 letter stated: "President Putin's foreign policy
>is increasingly marked by
>a threatening attitude toward Russia's neighbors and
>Europe's energy security,
>the return of rhetoric of militarism and empire, and
>by a refusal to comply
>with Russia's international treaty obligations. In
>all aspects of Russian
>political life, the instruments of state power appear
>to be being rebuilt and
>the dominance of the security services to grow. We
>believe that this conduct
>cannot be accepted as the foundation of a true
>partnership between Russia and
>the democracies of NATO and the European Union."15
>Among the 100 signatories were many prominent
>neoconservatives, including Max
>Boot, Ellen Bork, Thomas Donnelly, Carl Gershman,
>Bruce Jackson, Robert Kagan,
>Penn Kemble, Clifford May, Joshua Muravchik, William
>Kristol, Gary Schmitt,
>Danielle Pletka, and James Woolsey. Prominent
>Democrats including Will
>Marshall, Joseph Biden, Richard Holbrooke, James
>Steinberg, and Madeleine 
>Albright also signed the PNAC letter. 
>The most recent PNAC report, Iraq: Setting the
>Record Straight, is an apologia
>for the disastrous invasion and war. It concludes that
>President Bush's
>decision to act "derived from a perception of Saddam's
>intentions and
>capabilities, both existing and potential, and was 
>grounded in the reality of
>Saddam's prior behavior." The PNAC report blames the
>reporting on the UN
>inspection teams and U.S. government statements that
>"left wide gaps in the
>public understanding of what the president faced on
>March 18, 2003, and what we
>have learned since." Also PNAC charges that
>administration critics "selectively
>used material in the historical record to reinforce
>their case against the 
>president's policy." In other words, rather than
>recognizing what we now
>know--that much of the intelligence presented to the
>public to justify the
>attack was false--it insists that the president made
>the right choice and makes
>no apology for its own role in urging the 
>administration to
>invade Iraq.16
>PNAC Loses Traction PNAC's activities
>dwindled in 2005, and there are no
>new postings to its website in 2006. In 2005 PNAC did
>produce one public letter
>(on increasing size of U.S. ground forces) and one
>project report on Iraq. The
>"What's New" section of its website does not display
>any new content for 2006
>but has articles written in 2005 by PNAC associates 
>Gary Schmitt, Ellen Bork,
>and Daniel McKivergan, most of which were published
>in William Kristol's Weekly
>Standard.17
>The war on terrorism that followed the Sept. 11
>attacks spawned an array of
>other neoconservative organizations and front groups
>that share PNAC's views 
>about U.S. global dominance and whose key figures have
>been associated with
>PNAC. Several of these entities--such as the Committee
>for the Liberation of
>Iraq, U.S. Committee on NATO, and the Coalition for
>Democracy in Iran--were 
>formed as ad hoc pressure groups closely associated
>with PNAC and have now
>folded or become dormant. Other groups, notably the
>Foundation for the Defense
>of Democracies, have emerged as major institutions
>with a staff and budget far
>larger than PNAC. 
>The founders, William Kristol and Robert Kagan,
>established PNAC as a political
>project to set a new agenda for U.S. foreign and
>military policy. Unlike many
>of the new neoconservative-led foreign policy groups,
>such as the Foundation
>for the Defense of Democracies and the Committee on
>the Present Danger (III),
>PNAC never had pretensions of being a bipartisan
>organization. All PNAC's key
>figures have been Republicans. 
>In an administration with a foreign policy team
>largely composed of PNAC 
>associates, PNAC's role in setting the foreign policy
>agenda for the new
>century was quite successful. For the
>neoconservatives, the new challenge is to
>forge bipartisan support for this agenda of U.S. 
>supremacy, preventive war, and
>regime change--focused mainly on the Middle East. FDD
>and the Committee on the
>Present Danger aim to meet this challenge, although
>both groups are primarily
>Republican. 
>Since Bush became president in 2000, and
>especially after Sept. 11, the 
>neoconservatives working outside the administration
>have attempted to set the
>broad ideological and specific policy directions of
>the administration's
>foreign policy. The American Enterprise Institute has 
>functioned as the
>neoconservatives' main think tank, and William 
>Kristol's Weekly Standard is the
>neocons' main policy magazine. Both AEI and the Weekly
>Standard have been
>closely linked to PNAC since its founding. 
>In the course of the Bush presidency, differences
>have emerged in the circle of
>social conservatives and hawks that PNAC brought
>together in 1997. Some like 
>Francis Fukuyama have backed away from the imperialism
>of PNAC and the 
>neoconservative camp due to what they view as a
>dangerous international 
>overreach. Others, while generally supportive of the
>Bush administration's
>stance on the "global war on terror," have become 
>increasingly critical of its
>foreign, military, and domestic policies. The split
>between PNAC associates
>inside the government and many outside has
>consequently grown in recent years. 
>Some of the problems identified in PNAC's 1997
>"Statement of Principles" have
>come back to undermine conservative unity around
>foreign policy. The first 
>paragraph of PNAC's statement of principles began with
>these observations:
>"American foreign and defense policy is adrift ...."
>In addition to criticizing
>"the incoherent policies of the Clinton 
>administration," conservatives "have
>also resisted isolationist impulses from within their
>own ranks. But
>conservatives have not confidently advanced a
>strategic vision of America's
>role in the world. They have not set forth guiding
>principles for American
>foreign policy. They have allowed differences over
>tactics to obscure potential
>agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not
>fought for a defense
>budget that would maintain American security and
>advance American interests in
>the new century." 
>Main areas of current conservative dispute
>include immigration policy, stem
>cell -research, levels of troop commitments in Iraq,
>so-called 
>democracy-promotion strategies, Israel issues, and
>U.S. relations with China,
>North Korea, and Iran. Although the neocon camp and
>their allies, including the
>Rumsfeld-Cheney foreign policy team, are all 
>hard-liners with respect to Iran,
>there are public differences over which groups should
>receive U.S. assistance.
>While the leading neocon figures on Iran policy, like
>Michael Rubin and Kenneth
>Timmerman, oppose funding the Mujahedin e-Khalq
>(MEK), a cult-like group with 
>militants in Iraq accused of human rights abuses and
>considered a terrorist
>group by the State Department, other players in the
>Iran policy debate like
>Raymond Tanter and the Iran Policy Committee, are MEK
>boosters. 
>Splits have also emerged on Israel, with groups
>such the Center for Security
>Policy adamantly opposing any return of seized land,
>while others such as 
>Elliott Abrams cautiously support the policies of
>former Prime Minister Ariel
>Sharon and current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Another
>widening divide among
>neoconservatives surfaced in the immigration debate,
>with an increasing number
>of neoconservatives--including Richard Perle, David
>Frum, and Frank
>Gaffney--distancing themselves from the historical
>support of neoconservatives
>for a liberal immigration policy, while others, 
>notably William Kristol, have
>been sharply critical of social conservatives for
>their restrictionist
>positions. Two neoconservative centers--FDD and
>especially the Center for
>Security Policy--have positioned themselves in the
>restrictionist camp. 
>These and other splits have eroded the original
>PNAC coalition of
>neoconservatives, militarists, and social
>conservatives, although the Center
>for Security Policy, FDD, Committee on the Present
>Danger (III), and other new 
>groups have established similar coalitions with
>different memberships. Despite
>saying that PNAC was modeled after the second
>Committee on the Present Danger,
>neither Kristol nor Kagan are members of the newly
>organized Committee on the
>Present Danger.18
>Although PNAC is dead or dormant, the view that
>this century should be another
>American century remains a closely held belief by the
>neoconservatives, most of
>whom spread their ideas from their positions within
>an ever-widening 
>infrastructure of policy institutes, front groups,
>think tanks, journals, and
>foundations. But the determination to reinforce U.S. 
>global power and to serve
>as the planet's arbiter of what's good and evil,
>wrong and right, is one that
>extends far beyond the neocons themselves into other
>major political
>actors--social conservatives, nationalists, hawks,
>self-styled progressive
>internationalists--and into the heart of Corporate
>America, especially the
>military-industrial complex and the U.S. energy
>sector. 
>The tragedy and moral depravity of U.S. foreign
>policy in Iraq and throughout
>the Middle East should awaken America from delusions
>of grandeur and 
>superiority--and the global backlash against the
>imperial ambitions of PNAC and
>the Bush administration signal that a U.S. imperium
>would have few subjects.
>But the ideologues will keep calling for military and 
>"democracy-building"
>intervention, and those business sectors who stand to
>gain from an imperial
>policy of controlling resources and making war will
>continue to justify U.S.
>interventionism with "peace through strength" and
>pretentious talk of America's
>moral mission. 
>PNAC's Kristol and Kagan PNAC was founded,
>managed, funded, and shaped
>almost exclusively by neocons. PNAC's
>cochairs--William Kristol and
>Robert Kagan. Both are the offspring of families with
>deep roots in
>conservative scholasticism. 
>Like many neoconservatives, both men have multiple
>identities as academics,
>authors, political analysts, former government
>officials, magazine editors, and
>political activists, though their political activism
>does not take the form of
>involving themselves directly in party politics or
>running for office. In keeping
>with neoconservative tradition, they have sought to
>effect political change by
>creating new intellectual frameworks to guide elite
>social and political
>movements. 
>Taking cues from older neoconservatives, their close
>attention to the power of
>ideas did not keep them ensconced in ivory towers. As 
>second-generation
>neoconservatives, they are keenly aware that ideas 
>won't have results unless
>there is a network of publications, media outlets,
>think tanks, and coalitions to
>give them political projection. 
>William Kristol is the son of Irving Kristol and
>Gertrude Himmelfarb, two of the
>most influential first-generation neoconservatives.
>The elder Kristol is widely
>described as the "godfather of neoconservatism." 
>The younger Kristol is a Harvard-trained and
>Straussian political scientist who
>was associated with the right-wing Federalist Society 
>in its early years. His
>graduate thesis argued that the judiciary should take
>more seriously its elite
>role in protecting the stability of the political
>regime by obstructing
>excessively democratic and egalitarian demands for
>radical change in the
>conservative constitutional order. As a precocious
>teenager, Kristol was a 
>Democratic Party volunteer in the electoral campaigns
>of Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
>Hubert Humphrey, and Henry Jackson. Like his father,
>Bill abandoned the
>Democratic Party in the 1970s to become a Republican 
>Party stalwart.19
>During the second Reagan administration, Kristol was
>chief of staff to Secretary
>of Education William Bennett. Upon leaving the 
>administration in late 1988,
>Kristol became a fellow at the Madison Center for
>Education Affairs, founded in
>1978 as the Institute for Education Affairs by
>Kristol's father and William
>Simon. 
>Kristol was Vice President Dan Quayle's chief of
>staff during the administration
>of George H.W. Bush. Dubbed "Dan Quayle's Brain" in a 
>1990 New Republic article,
>Kristol endeared himself to big business in his role
>as director of the Council
>on Competitiveness, housed in Quayle's office.
>Kristol's technique for increasing
>the competitiveness of U.S. industries was to respond
>to corporate requests for
>a review of federal regulations that affected their
>businesses and then to wield
>the influence of the vice president's office to soften
>the regulations.20 A New
>York Times profile of Vice President Quayle called
>Kristol's staff "one of the
>leanest and meanest operations in Washington."21 
>After Bush's electoral defeat to
>Bill Clinton in November 1992, Kristol mounted a
>personal campaign to persuade
>the lame-duck president to extend pardons to all of
>the indicted Iran-contra
>figures. Bush had been planning to pardon Caspar
>Weinberger, a longtime
>Republican Party 
>stalwart, but had planned to leave others such as
>Elliott Abrams and John
>Poindexter to face jail time. Kristol, a personal
>friend of Abrams, prevailed upon
>the elder Bush to pardon Elliott and his cohorts on
>Christmas Eve 1992--sealing
>Kristol's mounting reputation as a skilled political
>operator.22
>During the Clinton presidency, Kristol took on the
>challenge of setting a new
>political course for Republicans in the post-Cold War 
>era. With support from
>right-wing foundations, largely the Bradley 
>Foundation, Kristol spearheaded two
>closely interrelated initiatives: the New Citizenship
>Project, which is the
>sponsor of PNAC, and the Project for the Republican
>Future. Working outside the
>Republican Party structure, Kristol helped formulate
>the strategy and agenda that
>contributed to the party's successful comeback in the
>1994 elections. In 1996,
>Kristol, together with neocon scion John Podhoretz,
>founded the highly influential
>neocon magazine Weekly Standard with the backing of
>Rupert Murdoch, and the next
>year cofounded PNAC with Robert Kagan. 
>In 2002 Media Bypass reported, "In what has been
>called 'punditgate,'
>conservative journalists Bill Kristol and Erwin
>Stelzer of the Weekly Standard
>... have been exposed for accepting Enron largesse.
>... Kristol, chief of staff
>to former Vice President Dan Quayle, took $100,000
>without disclosing the
>payments at the time. ... Kristol, the editor of the
>Weekly Standard who postures
>as an independent journalist, got the money for
>serving on an Enron advisory
>board, and, in the words of Stelzer, keeping Enron
>Chairman Ken Lay and his team
>'up to date on general public policy trends'."23
>Donald Kagan, the father of the clan, author of
>numerous books on classical
>military history, and a contributor to such
>neoconservative outlets as Public
>Interest, Commentary, and the Wall Street Journal, is
>perhaps best known for While
>America Sleeps, a book he coauthored in 2000 with his
>son Frederick Kagan. Along
>with William Kristol, Robert Kagan, son of Donald and
>brother of Frederick, 
>founded the Project for the New American Century and
>helped establish the Weekly
>Standard. All three Kagans are PNAC signatories, and
>they all participated on the
>PNAC study team that produced Rebuilding America's
>Defensesand also contributed
>chapters to the Present Dangers blueprint of a U.S.
>grand strategy. Robert Kagan,
>in addition to being an excellent writer, has
>involved himself directly in
>politics, serving in the Reagan administration in a
>variety of posts (1983-88) at
>the U.S. Information Agency and State Department,
>including chief speechwriter
>for Secretary of
>State George Shultz. Robert Kagan's wife, Victoria
>Nuland, is a career diplomat,
>who before becoming national security adviser to Vice
>President Cheney in March
>2003 served as deputy ambassador to NATO.24
>The Committees on the Present Danger
>as PNAC Model The Project
>for the New American Century represented the third
>time since
>1950 that an elite coalition of individuals had joined
>together 
>to raise the "present danger" alarm. In 1950 and again
>in 1976,
>leading figures in the foreign policy establishment,
>corporate
>America, and academia formed groups--both called the
>Committee on
>the Present Danger (CPD)--to make the case to the
>U.S. public and
>policy community that the Soviet Union had achieved a
>degree of
>military superiority over the United States. 
>The two CPDs argued that only by vastly increasing
>U.S. military spending could
>America achieve the military dominance necessary to 
>protect the homeland and
>maintain international peace and stability. They also
>called for stronger
>commitments to foreign and military policies that
>would reinforce an expanding
>U.S. global reach--militarily, economically, and
>politically. 
>William Kristol and Robert Kagan credit the
>Committee on the Present Danger (II)
>as an elite social model that successfully realigned
>U.S. foreign and military
>policy. They recalled how "a group of concerned 
>citizens" formed the second CPD
>in the mid-1970s "to rally Americans to confront" the
>Soviet Union. Moreover, the
>CPD "challenged the comfortable consensus" and
>"called for a military build-up
>and a broad ideological and strategic assault on
>Soviet communism." Initially,
>the CPD's recommendations were dismissed as "either
>naïve or reckless," but,
>claimed PNAC's founders, events demonstrated "how
>right" the Committee on the
>Present Danger was in its assessment of the communist 
>threat.25
>Although the 25 signatories (together with PNAC's
>cofounders Kristol and Kagan)
>of PNAC's "Statement of Principles" were Republican
>Party stalwarts, PNAC was
>established more as an agenda-setting and 
>ideologically political project than a
>committee of Republican Party strategists. In
>contrast to the Committee on the
>Present Danger II model, PNAC did not seek a broad
>bipartisan coalition either.
>Rather, it was established in the conviction that the
>right combination of ideas
>was the fundamental first step for putting the right
>wing into political power. 
>Like the second Committee on the Present Danger, the
>Project for the New American
>Century functioned as a coalition that advocated a
>sharp shift in U.S. foreign
>policy toward greater militarism and away from 
>liberal internationalism. However,
>unlike either of the first two CPDs, PNAC was formed
>less as a committee of
>prominent citizens than as a political project, and
>is driven more by ideology
>than by disagreements within America's power elite. 
>Also unlike its CPD predecessors, PNAC did not see
>the need to include the
>presidents or CEOs of major universities, foundations,
>or even corporations.
>Independent and brash, PNAC takes stock in the power 
>of its ideas rather than in
>formal alliances with political party loyalists or
>grassroots constituencies.
>Like Kristol's Project for the Republican Future,
>PNAC has the chutzpah to mount
>a political project outside the structures and
>processes of either political
>party. Each person in the original PNAC team was
>carefully chosen to represent 
>different sectors of the right-wing coalition as part
>of this ambitious political
>project. 
>At least initially, PNAC took care not to be too
>alarmist about the perceived
>dangers threatening America and the country's
>inadequate defenses. The first CPD
>had inadvertently fueled a right-wing populist 
>movement that targeted the very
>architects of containment militarism for being too
>soft on communism and being
>overly concerned with Europe (as opposed to Asia).
>The fear-mongering agenda of
>the second CPD, as implemented by the Reagan
>administration, so frightened
>Americans that it sparked a widespread citizens'
>anti-nuclear weapons movement
>that succeeded in pressuring the president himself to
>adopt--at least 
>rhetorically--an anti-nuclear weapons policy. 
>Wolfowitz, Cheney, Khalilzad, and Libby constituted
>the team that fashioned the
>1992 Defense Policy Guidance. But the "Statement of 
>Principles" was situated
>within the standard "peace through strength" 
>framework of foreign policy hawks.
>It omitted any language that would have explicitly
>foreshadowed PNAC's agenda of
>preemptive strikes, regime change, and other measures
>to block any challenges to
>U.S. supremacy in the next century--all of which were
>prefigured in the 1992 
>Defense Policy Guidance. 
>In June 2004 a new coalition of neoconservatives and
>hawks formed a new Committee
>on the Present Danger. Like the first and second CPDs,
>the third incarnation is a
>bipartisan political project, although dominated by
>neoconservatives. (See IRC
>Special Report: The "Present Danger" War Parties, June
>2006.) 
>Tom Barry is policy director of
>the International Relations
>Center, online at www.irc-online.org and the author or
>editor
>of numerous books on U.S. foreign policy.
>
>Sources 
>In 2001 alone, PNAC received $450,000 from the
>right-wing Lynde and Harry 
>Bradley Foundation. Other major PNAC funders include
>the John M. Olin 
>Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation, and the
>Scaife Family Foundations. 
>"Statement of Principles," Project for the New
>American Century, June 3, 1997.
>http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm.
>
>Interview with Gary Schmitt by IRC Research
>Associate Michael Flynn, June 13,
>2003. 
>William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a
>Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,"
>Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996. 
>"Statement of Principles," Project for the New
>American Century, June 3,
>1997.; William Kristol and Robert Kagan,
>"Introduction: National Interest and
>Global Responsibility," in Kagan and Kristol, eds.,
>Present Dangers: Crisis and
>Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy
>(San Francisco: Encounter
>Books and Project for the New American Century, 2000).
>
>Kristol and Kagan, Present Dangers, p. 10. 
>Quoted in Walter LaFeber, The American Age (New
>York: Norton, 1989), p. 380. 
>About PNAC, May 16, 2006. 
>http://www.newamericancentury.org/aboutpnac.htm.
>Project for the New American Century, Media
>Transparency.
>
>http://www.mediatransparency.org/recipientgrants.php?recipientID=2243.
>New Citizenship Project, Media Transparency.
>
>http://www.mediatransparency.org/recipientgrants.php?recipientID=258.
>
>http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm.
>"A Complete List of PNAC Signatories and
>Contributing Writers," Right Web,
>International Relations Center.
>
>http://rightweb.irc-online.org/charts/pnac-chart.php.
>PNAC letters and statements through 2003 can be
>accessed at:
>
>http://rightweb.irc-online.org/charts/pnac-chart.php.
>"Letter to Congress on Increasing U.S. Ground
>Forces," PNAC, January 28, 2005.
>
>http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20050128.htm
>
>http://www.newamericancentury.org/russia-20040928.htm
>Iraq: Setting the Record Straight, PNAC, April
>2005.
>http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-042005.pdf.
>http://www.newamericancentury.org/whatsnew.htm.
>http://www.fightingterror.org/members/index.cfm.
>Howard Kurtz, "Right Face, Right Time," Washington
>Post, Feb 1, 2000. 
>John Meacham, "The GOP's Master Strategist,"
>Washington Monthly, September 1994.
>New York Times, July 5, 1992.
>John Meacham, "The GOP's Master Strategist,"
>Washington Monthly, September 1994.
>Cliff Kincaid, "'Free Market' Conservatives Burned
>in Enrongate," Media Bypass,
>March 2002.
>http://www.mediabypass.com/archives/mar-02.htm. 
>Jim Lobe, "All in the Family," Inter Press Service,
>March 7, 2003.
>Kristol and Kagan, "An Overview," Present Dangers ,
>p. 3.
>
>
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