[GJM] [IndianJustice] New Green Century

Wed Jul 26 00:06:20 MDT 2006

This is the new Green Century and that is what I would like to work for ..

  Ecologically hostile responses of the American presidents over the last 10 years, continued insolence, moral depravity does not quality US to be the leader..

  We must work for The NEW GREEN CENTURY...WITH ECOLOGICAL SAFETY AND COLLECTIVE WELLBEING
  Dr.Muhammad Mukhtar Alam

Sukla Sen <suklasenp at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
          I/III.
http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/186en.htm

Commentary No. 186, June 1, 2006

"Whose Century is the 21st Century?"

In 1941, Henry Luce proclaimed the twentieth century
the American century. And most analysts have agreed
with him ever since. Of course, the twentieth century
was more than merely the American century. It was the
century of the decolonization of Asia and Africa. It
was the century of the flourishing of both fascism and
communism as political movements. And it was the
century of both the Great Depression and the
incredible, unprecedented expansion of the
world-economy in the 25 years after the end of the
Second World War.

But nonetheless, it was the American century. The
United States became the unquestioned hegemonic power
in the period 1945-1970 and shaped a world-system to
its liking. The United States became the premier
economic producer, the dominant political force, and
the cultural center of the world-system. The United
States, in short, ran the show, at least for a while.

Now, the United States is in visible decline. More and
more analysts are willing to say this openly, even if
the official line of the U.S. establishment is to deny
this vigorously, just as a certain portion of the
world left insists on the continued hegemony of the
United States. But clear-minded realists on all sides
recognize that the U.S. star is growing dimmer. The
question that underlies all serious prognostication is
then, whose century is the twenty-first century?

Of course, it is only 2006, and a bit early to answer
this question with any sense of certainty. But
nonetheless, political leaders everywhere are making
bets on the answer and shaping their policies
accordingly. If we rephrase the question to ask merely
what may the world look like in, for example, 2025, we
may at least be able to say something intelligent.

There are basically three sets of answers to the
question of what the world will look like in 2025. The
first is that the United States will enjoy one last
fling, a revival of power, and will continue to rule
the roost in the absence of any serious military
contender. The second is that China will displace the
United States as the world's superpower. The third is
that the world will become an arena of anarchic and
relatively unpredictable multi-polar disorder. Let us
examine the plausibility of each of these three
predictions.

The United States on top? There are three reasons to
doubt this. The first, an economic reason, is the
fragility of the U.S. dollar as the sole reserve
currency in the world-economy. The dollar is sustained
now by massive infusions of bond purchases by Japan,
China, Korea, and other countries. It is highly
unlikely that this will continue. When the dollar
falls dramatically, it may momentarily increase the
sale of manufactured goods, but the United States will
lose its command on world wealth and its ability to
expand the deficit without serious immediate penalty.
The standard of living will fall and there will be an
influx of new reserve currencies, including the euro
and the yen.

The second reason is military. Both Afghanistan and
especially Iraq have demonstrated in the last few
years that it is not enough to have airplanes, ships,
and bombs. A nation must also have a very large land
force to overcome local resistance. The United States
does not have such a force, and will not have one, due
to internal political reasons. Hence, it is doomed to
lose such wars.

The third reason is political. Nations throughout the
world are drawing the logical conclusion that they can
now defy the United States politically. Take the
latest instance: The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, which brings together Russia, China, and
four Central Asian republics, is about to expand to
include India, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Iran. Iran has
been invited at the very moment that the United States
is trying to organize a worldwide campaign against the
regime. The Boston Globe has called this correctly "an
anti-Bush alliance" and a "tectonic shift in
geopolitics."

Will China then emerge on top by 2025? To be sure,
China is doing quite well economically, is expanding
its military force considerably, and is even beginning
to play a serious political role in regions far from
its borders. China will undoubtedly be much stronger
in 2025; however, China faces three problems that it
must overcome.

The first problem is internal. China is not
politically stabilized. The one-party structure has
the force of economic success and nationalist
sentiment in its favor. But it faces the discontent of
about half of the population that has been left
behind, and the discontent of the other half about the
limits on their internal political freedom.

China's second problem concerns the world-economy. The
incredible expansion of consumption in China (along
with that of India) will take its toll both on the
world's ecology and on the possibilities of capital
accumulation. Too many consumers and too many
producers will have severe repercussions on worldwide
profit levels.

The third problem lies with China's neighbors. Were
China to accomplish the reintegration of Taiwan, help
arrange the reunification of the Koreas, and come to
terms (psychologically and politically) with Japan,
there might be an East Asian unified geopolitical
structure that could assume a hegemonic position.

All three of these problems can be overcome, but it
will not be easy. And the odds that China can overcome
these difficulties by 2025 are uncertain.

The last scenario is that of multi-polar anarchy and
wild economic fluctuations. Given the inability of
maintaining an old hegemonic power, the difficulty of
establishing a new one, and the crisis in worldwide
capital accumulation, this third scenario appears the
most likely.

by Immanuel Wallerstein

II/III.
http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/187en.htm

Commentary No. 187, June 15, 2006

"How Has Latin America Moved Left?"

The discussion on the leftward trend of Latin America
in recent years reflects all the confusion, worldwide,
about what it means to be on the left in the
twenty-first century. The confusion is among all wings
of world political opinion. There are various
explanations for this confusion. The most obvious
reason is that different people are measuring
different things as the criterion of moving left. The
second is that no such political tendency is perfectly
linear. It always reflects ups and downs, but that
doesn't mean that there isn't an overall trend. And
the third reason is that politicians notoriously speak
multiple languages to different audiences, but that
doesn't mean one cannot discern bottom lines.

The first thing to distinguish among criteria is
whether we are speaking of a given regime's position
on geopolitical issues or their internal policies. Of
course the two are linked. But nonetheless regimes are
not necessarily consistent. For Latin America the main
geopolitical issue is their attitude towards and
relationship with the United States. There seems
little question that, on this issue, the vast majority
of Latin American states have moved a considerable
distance since 2000. One only has to ask the U.S.
Department of State about it. They are quite aware
that their voice is no longer heard with the respect
and fear it once was. This is more than a matter of
Chavez's strident tones. We can see this even in the
volatile actions and largely centrist views of the
present government in Ecuador. The fact is that openly
rightwing candidates do not win elections any more,
except in Colombia. This simply wasn't true as
recently as a decade ago.

The second thing to look at is the position of the
various regimes on questions relating to the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and the multiple propositions for free
trade agreements offered by the United States. If the
WTO is stymied in its present negotiations, if the IMF
matters a lot less than it did a decade ago, and if
the United States can get nowhere in the proposed Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), it is in large part
due to the numerous "left-of-center" governments in
Latin America which have put obstacles in their way.
This is not the doing of Cuba but of Brazil and
Argentina. Even in Peru, the newly-elected very
centrist president, Alan Garcia, who defeated Ollanta
Humala (openly endorsed by Chavez), said in his first
post-victory declaration that he was going to review
critically every clause of the bilateral free trade
agreement the previous Peruvian government had been
negotiating with the United States.

Those who criticize the various new Latin American
regimes from the left tend to emphasize what they have
been doing internally more than their geopolitical
stances. There are several critical "internal" issues.
The first is the rights of the so-called indigenous
populations. This has been a political issue in Latin
American countries for over two centuries. But it is
only today that there is beginning to be a
breakthrough in terms of their rights. This is in
large part the result of the increased consciousness
and political mobilization of these populations.

Of course, this varies country by country. And the
power of indigenous populations is in part related to
their demographic strength. Still, notice what has
been happening. Presidential candidates of indigenous
origins have been elected in a number of countries.
Their mobilization was a crucial factor in the
election of Evo Morales, himself of these origins, in
Bolivia. Their mobilization has made it difficult for
Ecuador to stay in its traditionally rightwing
political position. We need scarcely mention the
obvious case of Mexico, which now lives and operates
within the context of a situation changed
fundamentally by the Zapatista rebellion. Even in a
country which has a rather small percentage of
indigenous peoples, such as Chile, their struggle has
now become a major issue with which the government
must contend.

The second issue, often closely allied to the first
one, is that of land reform. Here the left critics of
the concept of a leftward turn have probably their
strongest case. The fact is that the Brazilian Partido
dos Trabalhadores (PT) has in effect reneged on its
pledges to carry out some significant reform. And, in
consequence, its crucial supporter, the Movimento dos
Sem Terras (MST), has moved further and further away
from the PT. But the new Bolivian government has just
announced that it will move forward on land reform.
And if it does, this should create a big boost for
such movements in other countries.

The third internal issue is the control of natural
resources (not only mining and energy but water). This
doesn't always mean outright nationalization but it
certainly means a significant degree of state control
and a significant national retention of income
generated. Here too, bit by bit, albeit often slowly,
there has been movement. One need only read the
screams about protectionism to see that this is a
reality with which multinationals know they have to
come to terms today. In past decades, they could
easily arrange friendly coups d'état. This has become
very difficult, as Venezuela has demonstrated.

The fourth internal issue is the degree to which the
new regimes allocate significant additional resources
to education at all levels and to health-related
structures. Here too, as with land reform, the results
so far have been limited, although one of the reasons
has been lack of governmental resources, something
which may be overcome by measures in other domains. We
have to reserve judgment on this account.

Finally, there is the question of the degree to which
the military is being constrained from direct
interference in the national decision-making
processes. Latin America today is very different
indeed from the epoch, not so long ago, of military
coups supported by the United States, and military
regimes specializing in torture. Indeed, the amnesties
that the military arranged for themselves when they
returned to the barracks are being revoked, slowly and
carefully but up to this point successfully.

So, what is the overall picture? Latin America has
definitely moved left from where it was. Whether this
will continue and amplify in the next decade is a
function both of the evolving world geopolitical
picture and the degree to which left social movements
within Latin America will maintain cohesion and put
forward lucid programs.

by Immanuel Wallerstein

III/III.

http://www.irc-online.org/content/3296

Rise and Demise of the "New American Century" 
Tom Barry, IRC | June 28, 2006

International Relations Center

The glory days of the Project for the New American
Century (PNAC) quickly passed.
When neoconservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan
formed PNAC in 1997, they
aimed to set forth a new agenda for post-Cold War
foreign and military policy
that would ensure that the United States could claim
the 21 st century as its
own--where U.S. military dominance would not only
protect U.S. national security
and national interests but would also establish a
global Pax Americana. The
election of George W. Bush opened the door to the
Pentagon, vice president's
office, State Department, and the National Security
Council for PNAC associates,
many of whom--including Richard Cheney, Donald
Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, and Paul
Wolfowitz--became the leading figures in the Bush
administration's foreign policy
team. Although not all were neoconservatives
themselves, the PNAC associates 
brought neoconservative ideology and a common
conviction of U.S. supremacy with
them into
government. However, it was not until Sept. 11 that
the PNAC-dominated foreign
policy team got its chance to fast-forward their
plans to remake the world as a
U.S. dominion. 
Back in 2001 and even into 2002 few Americans--even
in foreign policy
circles--knew about the Project for the New American
Century or could speak
knowledgeably about the history and ideological
convictions of neoconservatives.
Nearly five years after Sept. 11 and more than three
years after the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, most Americans who follow foreign
policy and U.S. politics are
familiar with the term neoconservative and probably
have heard about the Project
for the New American Century. 
As the wars and occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have become quagmires, the
glory days of PNAC have been cut short by the limits
of U.S. power and the
follies of the Bush administration's arrogance. Yet 
by no means is it certain if
the lessons of PNAC's successes and delusions have
been learned, either by the
U.S. public or the U.S. policy community. The agenda
set out by PNAC in its 1997
"Statement of Principles" reflects the exceptionalism
and supremacy that still 
pervades this country. And many of PNAC's policy
prescriptions regarding regime
change, increased U.S. military budgets, unilateral 
action, and America's moral
mission remain part of the common political 
discourse. 
By 2005 PNAC began to fade from the political
landscape, and though the website
is still functioning, it has been dormant since late
that year. But the
neoconservatives, together with their Religious Right
and military-industrial
complex allies, remain prominent actors in shaping 
the directions of U.S. foreign
and military policy--some within government and
others from a wide array of
neocon-led think tanks, front groups, and policy
institutes. 
The IRC is publishing this special report on the
Project for the New American
Century, along with an accompanying report on the
Committee on the Present Danger,
as part of an effort to stimulate more reflection on
the dangers of the ideology
and political projects of the neoconservatives and
their allies. 
>From an office in the same building that houses
the American Enterprise
Institute (AEI) in downtown Washington and with
funding from the Bradley
Foundation, William Kristol established the Project
for the Republican Future
in 1993 in anticipation of the 1994 congressional
elections. Following the 
resounding victory of right-wing Republicans, he
founded the Weekly Standard in
1995 in the vacated offices of the Project for the
Republican Future. The next
year Kristol and Robert Kagan established the Project 
for the New American
Century, whose offices are also located in the 
American Enterprise Institute
building and which is also generously supported by
the Bradley Foundation.1
By the time Kristol and Kagan formulated the idea
for the Project for the New 
American Century in 1996, the widespread conservative
frustration at having to
endure another four years of Clinton liberals had
largely papered over the
conservative rift of the late 1980s. Newt Gingrich's 
"Contract with America"
played a key role in unifying conservatives around an
almost exclusively
domestic agenda of big-government bashing, glorifying
in traditional family
values, and attacking secular humanism. The domestic
side of a reinvigorated
right wing was coming together nicely in the 1990s,
as seen in the winning role
played by the "Contract with America" in ushering in
a Republican majority in
both houses of Congress under the Clinton presidency.

The right, however, had not recovered from the
loss of its chief mobilizing 
principle: militant anticommunism. Central to the
right's role in winning the
White House for Ronald Reagan in 1980 was the fusion
of three core conservative
constituencies: social conservatives, economic 
libertarians, and national
security militarists. In the late 1970s, 
neoconservatives played a key
strategic role in engineering this right-wing fusion,
providing many of the key
intellectual and ideological frameworks for the right
wing's expanding 
counter-establishment and for the right-wing
populists. 
If they were to reprise this same unifying role
in the late 1990s, the neocons
knew that the old political messages daring the
Democrats to associate 
themselves with the "L" word of liberalism would no
longer suffice. Positioning
themselves as New Democrats, Bill Clinton and Al Gore
had stolen the
neoconservative thunder on free market and big
government issues. 
The challenge was to create a "neo-Reaganite"
agenda--one that would appeal to
the same "moral majority" citizens who were still
fighting the backlash 
cultural wars against multiculturalism and the
counterculture of the 1960s, who
responded to messaging about moral clarity and
America's mission, and whose
sense of patriotism and nationalism could again be 
rallied to support increased
military spending and interventionism abroad.
Collectively, the
neoconservatives, the Republican Party's hawks, and
the social conservatives
aimed to awaken America from its slumber to wage the
'good fight against the
forces of evil' that were gathering round the world.
PNAC's founding statement
in 1997 crystallized this new sense of America's
power and moral mission. 
PNAC's 1997 "Statement of Principles" set forth a
new agenda for foreign and 
military policy that was described by William Kristol
and Robert Kagan as being
"neo-Reaganite." Signatories of this charter document
said that they aimed "to
make the case and rally support for American global 
leadership."2 Excerpts from
the statement follow: 
"We seem to have forgotten the essential elements
of the Reagan
administration's success: a military that is strong
and ready to meet both
present and future challenges; a foreign policy that
boldly and purposefully 
promotes American principles abroad; and national
leadership that accepts the
United States' global responsibilities." 
"Of course, the United States must be prudent in
how it exercises its power.
But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of
global leadership or the 
costs that are associated with its exercise. America
has a vital role in
maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and
the Middle East. If we
shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to
our fundamental interests.
The history of the 20th century should have taught us
that it is important to
shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet
threats before they
become dire. The history of this century should have
taught us to embrace the
cause of American leadership." 
"Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and
moral clarity may not be 
fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United
States is to build on the
successes of this past century and to ensure our
security and our greatness in
the next." 
Liberals and progressives might regard the
success of the Project for the New 
American Century setting a new foreign policy agenda
as an example of how the
right's unity, its messaging skills, its networking,
and the focused political
agenda of its small circle of foundations have 
enabled it to effect radical
political change. Recalling the group's origins in
the mid-1990s, PNAC's
executive director Gary Schmitt told a different
story: "It is actually just
the opposite. We started up precisely because the
right was so divided--between
the realists and the neo-isolationists." According to
Schmitt, "What we thought
was that a tradition that was both more American and
more particularly
Reaganite had been dropped from the agenda."3
That agenda--one of U.S. moral clarity and the
exercise of American power
against evil--was articulated in 1996 by Bill Kristol
and Robert Kagan in their
Foreign Affairs essay on creating a "neo-Reaganite"
foreign policy agenda.4
PNAC, said Schmitt, was the result of Kristol and
Kagan's decision to
"institutionalize" their vision. 
The Project for the New American Century struck a
discordant note in the
dominant political discourse. At a time when most
pundits and politicians were 
caught up in national debates about the price of
prescription drugs, the future
of social security, and the impact of globalization,
PNAC warned of "present
dangers" to U.S. national security. 
On the whole, however, PNAC's associates--many of
whom joined the
administration of George W. Bush--were hopeful. If
conservatives would continue
to resist "isolationist impulses from within their
own ranks" and if a new 
government would adopt the history-tested principle of
"peace through 
strength," the "greatness" of the United States would
be ensured in the next
century. If the American people were to again embrace
"a Reaganite policy of
military strength and moral clarity," they could look
forward to a New American
Century.5
The rhetoric, political tactics, and assumptions
about America's moral mission 
articulated by the Project for the New American
Century all had deep historical
resonance. The three signature features of the Project
for the New American
Century--the coalition-building to confront the 
"present danger," the vision of
a planetary Pax Americana, and the laying of a
nationalist claim to an entire
century--were echoes of former visionaries,
statesmen, and political leaders. 
In raising the alarm about the present danger,
PNAC sounded again the refrain
of post-WWII militarists and internationalists. Since
the late 1940s, factions
of the U.S. foreign policy elite have stoked the
patriotism and paranoia of
Americans with warnings about the "present danger" 
facing the United States if
lulled to sleep by dovish political and economic
elites. For hawks and
ideologues, the term "present danger," along with the
phrase "peace through
strength," has been the recurrent rallying cry of
those arguing for a more
aggressive national security strategy. 
In the advent of the 2000 presidential election,
PNAC's founders William Kristol
and Robert Kagan in their edited book Present Dangers 
invoked the words of
Henry Robinson Luce, who had even before the United
States entered World War II
predicted that the 20 th century could be the
"American Century" if it created
"an international moral order."6 The combination of
military strength, "a
vital international economic order" established by
the United States, and
foreign policy guided by America's God-ordained moral
mission would, according
to Luce, ensure American supremacy and international
peace.7
The Team with the Right Stuff PNAC embodied 
the new right-wing fusionism of
the late 1990s and Bush II presidency, melding the
various tendencies in the
neoconservative camp with leading social
conservatives and national security
hawks. 
PNAC succeeded in integrating the various
tendencies and diverse expertise
found within neoconservatism, uniting political
intellectuals associated with 
neocon publications (Norman Podhoretz and William
Kristol), scholars (Eliot
Cohen and Francis Fukuyama), military strategists
(Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay
Khalilzad), and cultural/religious warriors (William
Bennett and George Weigel).

Among its 27 founding members, including cochairs
Kristol and Kagan, only a
handful of individuals didn't match the
neoconservative prototype, although all
shared in the agendas and new ideological vision of
American supremacism as
articulated by the neocon political and military 
strategists. 
The two most prominent in the small number of
exceptions--Dick Cheney and
Donald Rumsfeld--were national security hard-liners
who had worked their way 
up in the Republican Party. Unlike neocon political
intellectuals, who prefer
to guide policy with their ideologies rather than to
attain political power as
elected officials, both Rumsfeld and Cheney worked 
together at the Office of
Economic Opportunity in the Ford administration--and
both established a
political base in the Republican Party as
congressional representatives. 
Both men had quickly gravitated to the
military-industrial complex--first as
strong supporters of higher military budgets while in
Congress, later as 
secretaries of defense and also as directors of and
investors in major Pentagon
contractors. Rumsfeld and Cheney were closely tied to
the economic interests in
U.S. foreign and military policy. Both had close ties
with the globalizing
military-industrial complex, high-tech industries,
and energy businesses. Both
Cheney and Rumsfeld were corporate CEOs when they
signed the PNAC charter. 
During their years in politics and business,
Rumsfeld and Cheney had forged
close alliances with neoconservatives. Rumsfeld, for
example, was fundraising 
chairman of Midge Decter's Committee for the Free
World, and Cheney as defense
secretary chose neoconservatives as his closest 
advisers as he did in 1992 when
directing the creation of a new Defense Policy
Guidance for the Pentagon. 
Albeit sparsely represented, right-wing social
conservatives closely associated
with the Christian Right constituted another
important sector in the PNAC 
coalition. Among those representing the social
conservative faction were Gary
Bauer, former director of the Family Research Council
and current president of
American Values; former Vice President Dan Quayle; and
two other prominent
cultural warriors: Steve Forbes and cofounder of
Empower America ,former
Representative Vin Weber. 
Forbes, the quintessential corporate
conservative, was also a former Empower 
America director and is associated with other
right-wing social conservative
and economic libertarian institutes. In 2002 Forbes,
with his neocon
colleagues, was a founding director of the Foundation
for the Defense of
Democracies (FDD) . As PNAC continued through 2005 to
issue new public 
declarations, it maintained its strong neoconservative
backbone while 
integrating top figures from other sectors of the
right wing's power complex
and occasionally a sprinkling of liberal hawks. 
Many of the signatories of PNAC's "Statement of
Principles" joined the Bush
administration. Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, I.
Lewis Libby, and Paul
Wolfowitz became key players in setting the
administration's foreign and
military policy. Other PNAC charter signatories who
joined the administration
as foreign and military policy officials were: Elliott
Abrams, special
assistant to the president and senior director for
Near East and North African
affairs at the National Security Council; Paula
Dobriansky, undersecretary of
State for Global Affairs; Aaron Friedberg, Vice
President Cheney's deputy
national security adviser; Zalmay Khalilzad,
ambassador to Afghanistan and
currently ambassador to Iraq; and Peter Rodman,
assistant secretary of defense
for International Affairs. 
Other signatories of PNAC's "Statement of
Principles" joined the administration
as advisers or became members of the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED).
Eliot Cohen, Dan Quayle, Henry Rowen, and Fred Iklé 
became members of
Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board. Vin Weber became 
NED's chairman, while Francis
Fukuyama became a NED board member, and was appointed
to serve on the
administration's Commission on Bioethics. 
PNAC Profile The Project for the New
American Century was established in
the spring of 1997 as a nonprofit organization "whose
goal is to promote 
American global leadership." PNAC is an initiative of
the New Citizenship
Project, whose chairman is William Kristol. PNAC
describes itself as a
"nonprofit educational organization supporting
American military,
diplomatic, and moral leadership." It has been
inactive since late 2005. 
PNAC's board of directors has the following members,
as listed on its website
(May 26, 2006): William Kristol (chairman), Robert
Kagan, Bruce Jackson, Mark
Gerson, and Randy Scheunemann. Staff members: Ellen
Bork (acting executive
director), Gary Schmitt (senior fellow), Thomas
Donnelly (senior fellow), Reuel
Gerecht (director of the Middle East Initiative),
Timothy Lehman, (assistant
director), and Michael Goldfarb (research associate).8
Between 2000 and 2003, PNAC received $170,000 in
grants from several
conservative foundations, including the Earhart, Olin,
and William J. Donner
foundations.9 From 1994 to 2004, the New Citizenship
Project that sponsors PNAC
and whose chairman is PNAC's William Kristol received
$3.3 million in grants,
mainly from the largest right-wing foundations:
Bradley, Olin, and Scaife
Foundations. The Bradley Foundation has been PNAC's
largest source of foundation 
support, granting PNAC $700,000 in 1997-2004. In its
first year of operations,
PNAC received grants from Bradley, Sarah Scaife, and
Olin foundations.10
PNAC Letters and Statements (1998-2003) 
Following its "Statement of
Principles," PNAC organized several reports and
sign-on letters
critical of the Clinton administration's foreign and
military policies.
These PNAC letters paralleled initiatives by the
Republican majority in
Congress to pressure Clinton to increase the military 
budget, implement
a missile defense system, and switch to a more 
confrontational foreign
policy that targeted rogue states. A January 1998
letter to Clinton
contended that the only "acceptable policy" vis-à-vis
Iraq was "one
that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be
able to use or
threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the 
near term, this
means a willingness to undertake military action, as 
diplomacy is
clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing 
Saddam Hussein and
his regime from power. That now needs to become the 
aim of American
foreign policy."11
During the Clinton presidency, PNAC organized two
sign-on letters to the
president (the second one on Milosevic) and one
letter to congressional leaders
(on Iraq), and it published one statement (on the
"Defense of Taiwan").12 In
2000 PNAC also published a book and a report, both of
which were designed as
blueprints for a new U.S. foreign and military policy.
The book Present Dangers
was edited by Robert Kagan and William Kristol and
included many PNAC associates
and other neoconservatives. Rebuilding America's
Defenses, written largely by
PNAC's Thomas Donnelly, offered an agenda for 
military transformation based on
the Defense Policy Guidance of 1992, the national
security strategy written by
Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad
under the supervision of
then-Defense Secretary Cheney. 
The election of George W. Bush enabled PNAC to
fast-forward its agenda for the
"new American century." Many PNAC principals moved
into the Pentagon, vice 
president's office, and State Department. It was not,
however, until after
Sept. 11 that the PNAC agenda was finally implemented.

On Sept. 20, 2001 PNAC sent a an open-letter to
President Bush that commended
his newly declared war on terrorism and urged him not
only to target Osama bin
Laden but also other "perpetrators," including Saddam
Hussein and Hezbollah.
The letter made one of the first arguments for regime
change in Iraq as part of
the war on terror. According to the PNAC letter, "It 
may be that the Iraqi
government provided assistance in some form to the
recent attack on the United
States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq
directly to the attack, any
strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and
its sponsors must include a
determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power
in Iraq. Failure to 
undertake such an effort will constitute an early and
perhaps decisive 
surrender in the war on international terrorism." 
The letter also pointed out that to undertake
this new war, it would be
necessary to inject more money into the nation's
defense budget: "A serious and
victorious war on terrorism will require a large
increase in defense spending.
Fighting this war may well require the United States
to engage a well-armed
foe, and will also require that we remain capable of
defending our interests
elsewhere in the world. We urge that there be no
hesitation in requesting
whatever funds for defense are needed to allow us to
win this war." 
Including the first PNAC letter on the war on
terrorism, PNAC published four
letters to Bush in 2001-2003. In April 2002 PNAC sent
a letter to Bush on 
"Israel and the War on Terrorism." This was followed
on November 25, 2002 by a
letter on Hong Kong, and then a January 23, 2003
letter on increasing the
military budget. In March 2003, PNAC published two 
statements on "Post-War
Iraq."13
Latest from PNAC The most recent PNAC letter
or statement was a January 28,
2005 letter addressed to congressional leaders
requesting that they "take the
steps necessary to increase substantially the size of
the active duty Army and
Marine Corps." It was the judgment of the PNAC
letter's signatories that an 
increase of 25,000 troops a year would be necessary to
meet what Condoleezza
Rice described as the country's "generational
commitment" to fighting terrorism
in the greater Middle East. 
According to the PNAC letter, "The administration
has been reluctant to adapt
to this new reality." But the PNAC signatories
countered: "We understand the 
dangers of continued federal deficits, and the fiscal
difficulty of increasing
the number of troops. But the defense of the United
States is the first
priority of the government." 
The signatories of the January 2005 letter were:
Peter Beinart, Jeffrey Bergner,
Daniel Blumenthal, Max Boot, Eliot Cohen, Ivo Daalder,
Thomas Donnelly, Michele
Fournoy, Frank Gaffney, Reuel Gerecht, Lt. Gen. Buster
Glosson (ret.), Bruce
Jackson, Frederick Kagan, Robert Kagan, Craig Kennedy,
Paul Kennedy, Col. Robert
Killebrew (ret.), William Kristol, Will Marshall,
Clifford May, Gen. Barry
McCaffrey (ret.), Daniel McKivergan, Joshua Muravchik,
Steven Nider, Michael
O'Hanlon, Mackubin Thomas Owens, Ralph Peters,
Danielle Pletka, Stephen Rosen,
Maj. Gen. Robert Scales (ret.), Randy Scheunemann,
Gary Schmitt, Walter
Slocombe, James Steinberg, and James Woolsey. 
Although many of the signatories belong to the
usual circle of neocons--such as
Boot, Cohen, Donnelly, Gaffney, Gerecht, the Kagans,
May, Muravchik, Schmitt, 
and Woolsey--other signatories were such liberal hawks
and liberal 
internationalists as Beinart, Marshall, Paul Kennedy,
James Steinberg, and
Michael O'Hanlon.14
Several months before, PNAC published an "Open
Letter to the Heads of State and
Government of the European Union and NATO" expressing
concern about the 
domestic and foreign policies of the Putin government
in Russia. The Sept. 28,
2004 letter stated: "President Putin's foreign policy
is increasingly marked by
a threatening attitude toward Russia's neighbors and
Europe's energy security,
the return of rhetoric of militarism and empire, and
by a refusal to comply
with Russia's international treaty obligations. In
all aspects of Russian
political life, the instruments of state power appear
to be being rebuilt and
the dominance of the security services to grow. We
believe that this conduct
cannot be accepted as the foundation of a true
partnership between Russia and
the democracies of NATO and the European Union."15
Among the 100 signatories were many prominent
neoconservatives, including Max
Boot, Ellen Bork, Thomas Donnelly, Carl Gershman,
Bruce Jackson, Robert Kagan,
Penn Kemble, Clifford May, Joshua Muravchik, William
Kristol, Gary Schmitt,
Danielle Pletka, and James Woolsey. Prominent
Democrats including Will
Marshall, Joseph Biden, Richard Holbrooke, James
Steinberg, and Madeleine 
Albright also signed the PNAC letter. 
The most recent PNAC report, Iraq: Setting the
Record Straight, is an apologia
for the disastrous invasion and war. It concludes that
President Bush's
decision to act "derived from a perception of Saddam's
intentions and
capabilities, both existing and potential, and was 
grounded in the reality of
Saddam's prior behavior." The PNAC report blames the
reporting on the UN
inspection teams and U.S. government statements that
"left wide gaps in the
public understanding of what the president faced on
March 18, 2003, and what we
have learned since." Also PNAC charges that
administration critics "selectively
used material in the historical record to reinforce
their case against the 
president's policy." In other words, rather than
recognizing what we now
know--that much of the intelligence presented to the
public to justify the
attack was false--it insists that the president made
the right choice and makes
no apology for its own role in urging the 
administration to
invade Iraq.16
PNAC Loses Traction PNAC's activities
dwindled in 2005, and there are no
new postings to its website in 2006. In 2005 PNAC did
produce one public letter
(on increasing size of U.S. ground forces) and one
project report on Iraq. The
"What's New" section of its website does not display
any new content for 2006
but has articles written in 2005 by PNAC associates 
Gary Schmitt, Ellen Bork,
and Daniel McKivergan, most of which were published
in William Kristol's Weekly
Standard.17
The war on terrorism that followed the Sept. 11
attacks spawned an array of
other neoconservative organizations and front groups
that share PNAC's views 
about U.S. global dominance and whose key figures have
been associated with
PNAC. Several of these entities--such as the Committee
for the Liberation of
Iraq, U.S. Committee on NATO, and the Coalition for
Democracy in Iran--were 
formed as ad hoc pressure groups closely associated
with PNAC and have now
folded or become dormant. Other groups, notably the
Foundation for the Defense
of Democracies, have emerged as major institutions
with a staff and budget far
larger than PNAC. 
The founders, William Kristol and Robert Kagan,
established PNAC as a political
project to set a new agenda for U.S. foreign and
military policy. Unlike many
of the new neoconservative-led foreign policy groups,
such as the Foundation
for the Defense of Democracies and the Committee on
the Present Danger (III),
PNAC never had pretensions of being a bipartisan
organization. All PNAC's key
figures have been Republicans. 
In an administration with a foreign policy team
largely composed of PNAC 
associates, PNAC's role in setting the foreign policy
agenda for the new
century was quite successful. For the
neoconservatives, the new challenge is to
forge bipartisan support for this agenda of U.S. 
supremacy, preventive war, and
regime change--focused mainly on the Middle East. FDD
and the Committee on the
Present Danger aim to meet this challenge, although
both groups are primarily
Republican. 
Since Bush became president in 2000, and
especially after Sept. 11, the 
neoconservatives working outside the administration
have attempted to set the
broad ideological and specific policy directions of
the administration's
foreign policy. The American Enterprise Institute has 
functioned as the
neoconservatives' main think tank, and William 
Kristol's Weekly Standard is the
neocons' main policy magazine. Both AEI and the Weekly
Standard have been
closely linked to PNAC since its founding. 
In the course of the Bush presidency, differences
have emerged in the circle of
social conservatives and hawks that PNAC brought
together in 1997. Some like 
Francis Fukuyama have backed away from the imperialism
of PNAC and the 
neoconservative camp due to what they view as a
dangerous international 
overreach. Others, while generally supportive of the
Bush administration's
stance on the "global war on terror," have become 
increasingly critical of its
foreign, military, and domestic policies. The split
between PNAC associates
inside the government and many outside has
consequently grown in recent years. 
Some of the problems identified in PNAC's 1997
"Statement of Principles" have
come back to undermine conservative unity around
foreign policy. The first 
paragraph of PNAC's statement of principles began with
these observations:
"American foreign and defense policy is adrift ...."
In addition to criticizing
"the incoherent policies of the Clinton 
administration," conservatives "have
also resisted isolationist impulses from within their
own ranks. But
conservatives have not confidently advanced a
strategic vision of America's
role in the world. They have not set forth guiding
principles for American
foreign policy. They have allowed differences over
tactics to obscure potential
agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not
fought for a defense
budget that would maintain American security and
advance American interests in
the new century." 
Main areas of current conservative dispute
include immigration policy, stem
cell -research, levels of troop commitments in Iraq,
so-called 
democracy-promotion strategies, Israel issues, and
U.S. relations with China,
North Korea, and Iran. Although the neocon camp and
their allies, including the
Rumsfeld-Cheney foreign policy team, are all 
hard-liners with respect to Iran,
there are public differences over which groups should
receive U.S. assistance.
While the leading neocon figures on Iran policy, like
Michael Rubin and Kenneth
Timmerman, oppose funding the Mujahedin e-Khalq
(MEK), a cult-like group with 
militants in Iraq accused of human rights abuses and
considered a terrorist
group by the State Department, other players in the
Iran policy debate like
Raymond Tanter and the Iran Policy Committee, are MEK
boosters. 
Splits have also emerged on Israel, with groups
such the Center for Security
Policy adamantly opposing any return of seized land,
while others such as 
Elliott Abrams cautiously support the policies of
former Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon and current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Another
widening divide among
neoconservatives surfaced in the immigration debate,
with an increasing number
of neoconservatives--including Richard Perle, David
Frum, and Frank
Gaffney--distancing themselves from the historical
support of neoconservatives
for a liberal immigration policy, while others, 
notably William Kristol, have
been sharply critical of social conservatives for
their restrictionist
positions. Two neoconservative centers--FDD and
especially the Center for
Security Policy--have positioned themselves in the
restrictionist camp. 
These and other splits have eroded the original
PNAC coalition of
neoconservatives, militarists, and social
conservatives, although the Center
for Security Policy, FDD, Committee on the Present
Danger (III), and other new 
groups have established similar coalitions with
different memberships. Despite
saying that PNAC was modeled after the second
Committee on the Present Danger,
neither Kristol nor Kagan are members of the newly
organized Committee on the
Present Danger.18
Although PNAC is dead or dormant, the view that
this century should be another
American century remains a closely held belief by the
neoconservatives, most of
whom spread their ideas from their positions within
an ever-widening 
infrastructure of policy institutes, front groups,
think tanks, journals, and
foundations. But the determination to reinforce U.S. 
global power and to serve
as the planet's arbiter of what's good and evil,
wrong and right, is one that
extends far beyond the neocons themselves into other
major political
actors--social conservatives, nationalists, hawks,
self-styled progressive
internationalists--and into the heart of Corporate
America, especially the
military-industrial complex and the U.S. energy
sector. 
The tragedy and moral depravity of U.S. foreign
policy in Iraq and throughout
the Middle East should awaken America from delusions
of grandeur and 
superiority--and the global backlash against the
imperial ambitions of PNAC and
the Bush administration signal that a U.S. imperium
would have few subjects.
But the ideologues will keep calling for military and 
"democracy-building"
intervention, and those business sectors who stand to
gain from an imperial
policy of controlling resources and making war will
continue to justify U.S.
interventionism with "peace through strength" and
pretentious talk of America's
moral mission. 
PNAC's Kristol and Kagan PNAC was founded,
managed, funded, and shaped
almost exclusively by neocons. PNAC's
cochairs--William Kristol and
Robert Kagan. Both are the offspring of families with
deep roots in
conservative scholasticism. 
Like many neoconservatives, both men have multiple
identities as academics,
authors, political analysts, former government
officials, magazine editors, and
political activists, though their political activism
does not take the form of
involving themselves directly in party politics or
running for office. In keeping
with neoconservative tradition, they have sought to
effect political change by
creating new intellectual frameworks to guide elite
social and political
movements. 
Taking cues from older neoconservatives, their close
attention to the power of
ideas did not keep them ensconced in ivory towers. As 
second-generation
neoconservatives, they are keenly aware that ideas 
won't have results unless
there is a network of publications, media outlets,
think tanks, and coalitions to
give them political projection. 
William Kristol is the son of Irving Kristol and
Gertrude Himmelfarb, two of the
most influential first-generation neoconservatives.
The elder Kristol is widely
described as the "godfather of neoconservatism." 
The younger Kristol is a Harvard-trained and
Straussian political scientist who
was associated with the right-wing Federalist Society 
in its early years. His
graduate thesis argued that the judiciary should take
more seriously its elite
role in protecting the stability of the political
regime by obstructing
excessively democratic and egalitarian demands for
radical change in the
conservative constitutional order. As a precocious
teenager, Kristol was a 
Democratic Party volunteer in the electoral campaigns
of Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Hubert Humphrey, and Henry Jackson. Like his father,
Bill abandoned the
Democratic Party in the 1970s to become a Republican 
Party stalwart.19
During the second Reagan administration, Kristol was
chief of staff to Secretary
of Education William Bennett. Upon leaving the 
administration in late 1988,
Kristol became a fellow at the Madison Center for
Education Affairs, founded in
1978 as the Institute for Education Affairs by
Kristol's father and William
Simon. 
Kristol was Vice President Dan Quayle's chief of
staff during the administration
of George H.W. Bush. Dubbed "Dan Quayle's Brain" in a 
1990 New Republic article,
Kristol endeared himself to big business in his role
as director of the Council
on Competitiveness, housed in Quayle's office.
Kristol's technique for increasing
the competitiveness of U.S. industries was to respond
to corporate requests for
a review of federal regulations that affected their
businesses and then to wield
the influence of the vice president's office to soften
the regulations.20 A New
York Times profile of Vice President Quayle called
Kristol's staff "one of the
leanest and meanest operations in Washington."21 
After Bush's electoral defeat to
Bill Clinton in November 1992, Kristol mounted a
personal campaign to persuade
the lame-duck president to extend pardons to all of
the indicted Iran-contra
figures. Bush had been planning to pardon Caspar
Weinberger, a longtime
Republican Party 
stalwart, but had planned to leave others such as
Elliott Abrams and John
Poindexter to face jail time. Kristol, a personal
friend of Abrams, prevailed upon
the elder Bush to pardon Elliott and his cohorts on
Christmas Eve 1992--sealing
Kristol's mounting reputation as a skilled political
operator.22
During the Clinton presidency, Kristol took on the
challenge of setting a new
political course for Republicans in the post-Cold War 
era. With support from
right-wing foundations, largely the Bradley 
Foundation, Kristol spearheaded two
closely interrelated initiatives: the New Citizenship
Project, which is the
sponsor of PNAC, and the Project for the Republican
Future. Working outside the
Republican Party structure, Kristol helped formulate
the strategy and agenda that
contributed to the party's successful comeback in the
1994 elections. In 1996,
Kristol, together with neocon scion John Podhoretz,
founded the highly influential
neocon magazine Weekly Standard with the backing of
Rupert Murdoch, and the next
year cofounded PNAC with Robert Kagan. 
In 2002 Media Bypass reported, "In what has been
called 'punditgate,'
conservative journalists Bill Kristol and Erwin
Stelzer of the Weekly Standard
... have been exposed for accepting Enron largesse.
... Kristol, chief of staff
to former Vice President Dan Quayle, took $100,000
without disclosing the
payments at the time. ... Kristol, the editor of the
Weekly Standard who postures
as an independent journalist, got the money for
serving on an Enron advisory
board, and, in the words of Stelzer, keeping Enron
Chairman Ken Lay and his team
'up to date on general public policy trends'."23
Donald Kagan, the father of the clan, author of
numerous books on classical
military history, and a contributor to such
neoconservative outlets as Public
Interest, Commentary, and the Wall Street Journal, is
perhaps best known for While
America Sleeps, a book he coauthored in 2000 with his
son Frederick Kagan. Along
with William Kristol, Robert Kagan, son of Donald and
brother of Frederick, 
founded the Project for the New American Century and
helped establish the Weekly
Standard. All three Kagans are PNAC signatories, and
they all participated on the
PNAC study team that produced Rebuilding America's
Defensesand also contributed
chapters to the Present Dangers blueprint of a U.S.
grand strategy. Robert Kagan,
in addition to being an excellent writer, has
involved himself directly in
politics, serving in the Reagan administration in a
variety of posts (1983-88) at
the U.S. Information Agency and State Department,
including chief speechwriter
for Secretary of
State George Shultz. Robert Kagan's wife, Victoria
Nuland, is a career diplomat,
who before becoming national security adviser to Vice
President Cheney in March
2003 served as deputy ambassador to NATO.24
The Committees on the Present Danger
as PNAC Model The Project
for the New American Century represented the third
time since
1950 that an elite coalition of individuals had joined
together 
to raise the "present danger" alarm. In 1950 and again
in 1976,
leading figures in the foreign policy establishment,
corporate
America, and academia formed groups--both called the
Committee on
the Present Danger (CPD)--to make the case to the
U.S. public and
policy community that the Soviet Union had achieved a
degree of
military superiority over the United States. 
The two CPDs argued that only by vastly increasing
U.S. military spending could
America achieve the military dominance necessary to 
protect the homeland and
maintain international peace and stability. They also
called for stronger
commitments to foreign and military policies that
would reinforce an expanding
U.S. global reach--militarily, economically, and
politically. 
William Kristol and Robert Kagan credit the
Committee on the Present Danger (II)
as an elite social model that successfully realigned
U.S. foreign and military
policy. They recalled how "a group of concerned 
citizens" formed the second CPD
in the mid-1970s "to rally Americans to confront" the
Soviet Union. Moreover, the
CPD "challenged the comfortable consensus" and
"called for a military build-up
and a broad ideological and strategic assault on
Soviet communism." Initially,
the CPD's recommendations were dismissed as "either
naïve or reckless," but,
claimed PNAC's founders, events demonstrated "how
right" the Committee on the
Present Danger was in its assessment of the communist 
threat.25
Although the 25 signatories (together with PNAC's
cofounders Kristol and Kagan)
of PNAC's "Statement of Principles" were Republican
Party stalwarts, PNAC was
established more as an agenda-setting and 
ideologically political project than a
committee of Republican Party strategists. In
contrast to the Committee on the
Present Danger II model, PNAC did not seek a broad
bipartisan coalition either.
Rather, it was established in the conviction that the
right combination of ideas
was the fundamental first step for putting the right
wing into political power. 
Like the second Committee on the Present Danger, the
Project for the New American
Century functioned as a coalition that advocated a
sharp shift in U.S. foreign
policy toward greater militarism and away from 
liberal internationalism. However,
unlike either of the first two CPDs, PNAC was formed
less as a committee of
prominent citizens than as a political project, and
is driven more by ideology
than by disagreements within America's power elite. 
Also unlike its CPD predecessors, PNAC did not see
the need to include the
presidents or CEOs of major universities, foundations,
or even corporations.
Independent and brash, PNAC takes stock in the power 
of its ideas rather than in
formal alliances with political party loyalists or
grassroots constituencies.
Like Kristol's Project for the Republican Future,
PNAC has the chutzpah to mount
a political project outside the structures and
processes of either political
party. Each person in the original PNAC team was
carefully chosen to represent 
different sectors of the right-wing coalition as part
of this ambitious political
project. 
At least initially, PNAC took care not to be too
alarmist about the perceived
dangers threatening America and the country's
inadequate defenses. The first CPD
had inadvertently fueled a right-wing populist 
movement that targeted the very
architects of containment militarism for being too
soft on communism and being
overly concerned with Europe (as opposed to Asia).
The fear-mongering agenda of
the second CPD, as implemented by the Reagan
administration, so frightened
Americans that it sparked a widespread citizens'
anti-nuclear weapons movement
that succeeded in pressuring the president himself to
adopt--at least 
rhetorically--an anti-nuclear weapons policy. 
Wolfowitz, Cheney, Khalilzad, and Libby constituted
the team that fashioned the
1992 Defense Policy Guidance. But the "Statement of 
Principles" was situated
within the standard "peace through strength" 
framework of foreign policy hawks.
It omitted any language that would have explicitly
foreshadowed PNAC's agenda of
preemptive strikes, regime change, and other measures
to block any challenges to
U.S. supremacy in the next century--all of which were
prefigured in the 1992 
Defense Policy Guidance. 
In June 2004 a new coalition of neoconservatives and
hawks formed a new Committee
on the Present Danger. Like the first and second CPDs,
the third incarnation is a
bipartisan political project, although dominated by
neoconservatives. (See IRC
Special Report: The "Present Danger" War Parties, June
2006.) 
Tom Barry is policy director of
the International Relations
Center, online at www.irc-online.org and the author or
editor
of numerous books on U.S. foreign policy.

Sources 
In 2001 alone, PNAC received $450,000 from the
right-wing Lynde and Harry 
Bradley Foundation. Other major PNAC funders include
the John M. Olin 
Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation, and the
Scaife Family Foundations. 
"Statement of Principles," Project for the New
American Century, June 3, 1997.
http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm.

Interview with Gary Schmitt by IRC Research
Associate Michael Flynn, June 13,
2003. 
William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a
Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996. 
"Statement of Principles," Project for the New
American Century, June 3,
1997.; William Kristol and Robert Kagan,
"Introduction: National Interest and
Global Responsibility," in Kagan and Kristol, eds.,
Present Dangers: Crisis and
Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy
(San Francisco: Encounter
Books and Project for the New American Century, 2000).

Kristol and Kagan, Present Dangers, p. 10. 
Quoted in Walter LaFeber, The American Age (New
York: Norton, 1989), p. 380. 
About PNAC, May 16, 2006. 
http://www.newamericancentury.org/aboutpnac.htm.
Project for the New American Century, Media
Transparency.

http://www.mediatransparency.org/recipientgrants.php?recipientID=2243.
New Citizenship Project, Media Transparency.

http://www.mediatransparency.org/recipientgrants.php?recipientID=258.

http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm.
"A Complete List of PNAC Signatories and
Contributing Writers," Right Web,
International Relations Center.

http://rightweb.irc-online.org/charts/pnac-chart.php.
PNAC letters and statements through 2003 can be
accessed at:

http://rightweb.irc-online.org/charts/pnac-chart.php.
"Letter to Congress on Increasing U.S. Ground
Forces," PNAC, January 28, 2005.

http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20050128.htm

http://www.newamericancentury.org/russia-20040928.htm
Iraq: Setting the Record Straight, PNAC, April
2005.
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-042005.pdf.
http://www.newamericancentury.org/whatsnew.htm.
http://www.fightingterror.org/members/index.cfm.
Howard Kurtz, "Right Face, Right Time," Washington
Post, Feb 1, 2000. 
John Meacham, "The GOP's Master Strategist,"
Washington Monthly, September 1994.
New York Times, July 5, 1992.
John Meacham, "The GOP's Master Strategist,"
Washington Monthly, September 1994.
Cliff Kincaid, "'Free Market' Conservatives Burned
in Enrongate," Media Bypass,
March 2002.
http://www.mediabypass.com/archives/mar-02.htm. 
Jim Lobe, "All in the Family," Inter Press Service,
March 7, 2003.
Kristol and Kagan, "An Overview," Present Dangers ,
p. 3.

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